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Abstract 
 
 The precautionary principle has emerged as one of the most contentious 
international norms within international environmental law. Yet, despite the vexing 
conceptual uncertainties confronting the precautionary principle, it is repeatedly invoked 
by policy makers and incorporated within international and domestic environmental law 
and agreements. This thesis explores how the international norm of precaution comes to be 
translated from the international sphere to domestic public policy. The research utilizes the 
pathways framework, which suggests that there are three additional pathways in additional 
to the direct implementation of international rules in national law and policy - international 
norms and discourse, markets and direct access - through which actors, institutions and 
interests can influence domestic and firm-level policy change. The findings propose an 
explanation of why Canada came to adopt a particular version of the precautionary 
principle, also revealing the complex nature of norm transfer, the significance of multiple 
causal pathways of influence and the interactions arising along these pathways. 
 
 
 
  
iii 
 
Acknowledgement  
 While I alone am responsible for this thesis, it is nevertheless at least as much a 
creation of several years of interaction with, and inspiration by, a large number of friends 
and colleagues as it is my own work. For this reason, I would like to express my warmest 
gratitude to all those individuals whose comments, questions, criticism, support and 
encouragement, personal and academic, have left a mark on this work. I also wish to thank 
those institutions which have supported me during the work on this thesis. Regrettably, but 
inevitably, the following list of names will be incomplete, and I hope that those who are 
missing will forgive me, and will still accept my sincere appreciation of their influence on 
my work. 
I wish to thank Professor Jeremy Rayner, my thesis advisor, for his academic supervision 
and support throughout all my years in graduate school.  
I would also like to extend my appreciation to my committee members, Distinguished 
Professor Peter Phillips, Professor Murray Fulton and Professor Martin Phillipson for their 
participation and suggestions. I was truly privileged to have the opportunity to work with 
them. 
I am grateful to the Saskatchewan Research Council, specifically Wanda Nyirfa, Cameron 
Zimmer, and Rostyk Hursky.  
I am also thankful to Nigel Hughes and Chris Fernandez for allowing me the opportunity 
to pursue my dreams. I will be eternally grateful for the doors you opened and for that I 
promise … Aterna Non Caduca. 
I would also like to thank my parents, Dawn and Compton, my brother Compton Jr., my 
sister-in-law Amanda, and my dearest sister Suella. Gratitude to them is beyond words. 
  
iv 
 
Lastly, but most importantly, I wish to thank my amazing wife Sonia, whose dedication 
and encouragements never faded – you are my answered prayer. For our beautiful daughter, 
Aria Ziva Noble, this one is for you my princess. Finally, Ad maiorem Dei gloriam! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
 
Dedication 
 
This thesis is dedicated to my wife Sonia who never stopped believing. 
Finally, this thesis is dedicated to those who fight for their dreams, to you I say, never give up, 
never stop believing, Carpe diem. 
 vi 
 
  Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ii 
Acknowledgement iii 
List of cases ix 
List of figures x 
List of Boxes xi 
List of Tables xii 
Abbreviations xiii 
Chapter 1. Introduction 1 
Introduction 1 
Problem Statement 3 
Background 4 
Chapter 2. KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS 6 
How do norms travel? 6 
Defining Biotechnology 9 
History of the Precautionary Principle and its Status in International Law 10 
Defining the Precautionary Principle 13 
Chapter 3. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 25 
Introduction 25 
Analytical Framework: Pathways Framework 26 
International Norms and Discourse                                                                                32 
International rules                                                                                                           34 
The market                                                                                                                      35 
Direct access to domestic policy-making processes pathway                                        36 
Research methodology 37 
Data Sources                                                                                                                   37 
 vii 
 
Measuring Policy Change                                                                                              38 
Chapter 4. SITUATING THE CANADIAN FORMULATION OF THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 39 
The Precautionary Principle and Canadian Provinces 39 
Environmental Harmonization Accord 40 
Government of Canada Discussion Document Discussion Document on the Precautionary 
Approach/Principle 41 
Canadian Environmental Legislation 43 
Chapter 5. PATHWAYS TO PRECAUTION 49 
The International Norms and Discourse Pathway 49 
Introduction  49 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety  49 
Changing the discourse and reassessing the norm  51 
The Frankenfood and the Killing Fields Framing  55 
Adjusting perceptions: Pro-GM Discourse  57 
International Rules Pathway                                                                                               58 
Introduction 58 
The Codex Alimentarius Commission and the Precautionary Principle 60 
NAFTA and the Precautionary Principle 62 
The Emergence of the Precautionary Principle in Canadian Domestic Legislation 63 
Indirect Application 64 
International Judicial Decisions and the Precautionary Principle 67 
The Case Concerning the Gabcikovo Nagymaros Project 68 
The Nuclear Tests Dispute (Australia, New Zealand et al. v. France) 69 
The Southern Bluefin Tuna cases 70 
The MOX Plant Case 71 
EC - Beef Growth Hormones Case 72 
Markets pathway 74 
Introduction 74 
Roundup Ready (RR) Wheat 75 
GM potato 80 
Direct Access Pathway 83 
Introduction 83 
Evolution of the Canadian Biotechnology Strategy 83 
Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee (CBAC) 85 
Direct Access and the CBAC Consultations 86 
 viii 
 
Bill C-474 88 
Chapter 6. ANALYTICAL DISCUSSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, CONCLUSION AND 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 91 
Analytical Discussion 91 
Policy implications 105 
Postscript 107 
REFERENCES 109 
 
 
  
 ix 
 
List of cases 
114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241, 
2001 SCC 40 
 
Alberta Wilderness Association v. Canada (Environment), 2009 FC 710, 45 C.E.L.R. (3d) 48 
 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep. 7. 
 
Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902, 2004 SCC 34 
 
MOX Plant case (Ireland v. United Kingdom) (Request for Provisional Measures) (ITLOS) [126 
ILR 259] 643, 1015 n24 
 
Nooksack Dace: Environmental Defence Canada v. Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2009 FC 878, 
45 C.E.L.R. (3d) 161. 
 
Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), International Court of Justice (ICJ), 20 December 
1974. 
 
Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) –Complaint by the 
United States, WT/DS26/R/USA, adopted 13 February 1998, as modified by the Appellate Body 
Report, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, DSR 1998:III, 699 
 
Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) –Complaint by the 
United States, WT/DS26/R/USA, adopted 13 February 1998, as modified by the Appellate Body 
Report, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, DSR 1998:III, 699 
 
R. v. Kingston (Corporation of the City),[2004], 187 O.C.A. 143. 
 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), ITLOS Cases No 3/4, 
117 I.L.R. 148 (Aug. 27, 1999) 
 
United States — Measure Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, 
WT/DS33/AB/R and Corr.1, adopted 23 May 1997, DSR 1997:I, 323 
 
Western Canada Wilderness Committee v. British Columbia (Minister of Environment and Parks), 
[1988] B.C.J. No. 436 (S.C.) 
 
 
  
 x 
 
List of figures 
 
Figure 1 - Pathways Framework ................................................................................................... 31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 xi 
 
List of Boxes 
Box 1- Key international formulations of the precautionary principle ......................................... 17 
 
 
  
 xii 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1- International Environmental Agreements which Incorporate the Precautionary Principle
............................................................................................................................................... 10 
Table 2 - Formulations of the Precautionary Principle ................................................................. 22 
Table 3 - Canadian Legislation utilizing the precautionary principle........................................... 44 
Table 4 –Situating the Precautionary Principle in Canadian Legislation ..................................... 45 
Table 5 - Organizations involved in the 2001 coalition to stop the introduction of RR Wheat ... 76 
Table 6 - Canadian groups who signed petition re: Rejection of Genetically Modified Wheat ... 79 
Table 7 – Power dynamics operating along the pathways ............................................................ 93 
 
  
 xiii 
 
Abbreviations 
 
 
 
 
Animals and Plant Health Inspection Service  APHIS 
British Colombia B.C. 
Canadian Biotechnology Action Network  CBAN 
Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee  CBAC 
Canadian Biotechnology Strategy  CBS 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act  CEAA 
Canadian Environmental Protection Act CEPA 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency  CFIA 
Canadian Wheat Board CWB 
Convention on Biological Diversity  CBD 
Energy Resources Conservation Board ERCB 
Environment Canada  EC 
Environmental Non-Governmental Organization  ENGO 
Environmental Protection Agency  EPA 
European Union  EU 
Flax Council of Canada  FCC 
Food and Drug Administration  FDA 
Genetically Modified  GM 
Genetically Modified Organisms GMOs 
Genetically-Modified Pest Protected Plants  GMPPPs 
Greenhouse Gas  GHG 
 xiv 
 
Health Canada  HC 
International Court of Justice  ICJ 
International Monetary Fund  IMF 
Living Modified Organism LMO 
Member of Parliament  MP 
Member of parliament  MP 
National Farmers Union NFU 
New Democratic Party NDP   
Non-Governmental Organization  NGO 
North American Free Trade Agreement  NAFTA 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  OECD  
Organic Agriculture Protection Fund  OAPF 
Pest Control Products Act  PCPA 
Plant Biotechnology Office  PBO 
Plants or Products with Novel Traits  PNTs 
Research and development  R&D 
Roundup Ready  RR 
Royal Society of Canada  RSC 
Recombinant DNA  rDNA 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures  SPS 
Species at Risk Act  SARA 
Statements of Environmental Values  SEVs 
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations  FAO 
 xv 
 
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea  ITLOS 
Union of BC Municipalities  UBCM 
United Kingdom  UK 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development UNCED 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization  UNESCO 
United Nations Environment Programme UNEP 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change  UNFCCC 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization UNIDO 
United States US 
World Bank WB 
World Health Organization WHO 
World Trade Organization WTO 
 
 
 1 
 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
The precautionary principle has emerged as one of the most contentious international 
norms within international environmental law. The principle, expressed in multiple formulations, 
is now enshrined in numerous international environmental agreements, and is arguably gaining 
status as a customary international norm. One of the most cited formulations of the principle is 
found in the 1992 Rio Declaration, which states that “[w]here there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation” (Rio Declaration 1992). 
Significant research and analysis has resulted in a better understanding of the principle 
(Cameron and Abouchar 1991a; Freestone and Hey 1996; Freestone 1991; Sands 2003; Sunstein 
2005). Recent research has focused on its impact on international trade and sustainable 
development (Perrez 2000; Anderson, Jackson, and Damania 2004). However, Perrez (2000) 
argues that, while the principle has been vigorously examined, there remains a lack of consensus 
with regard to its definition and what should trigger its application. According to Freestone & Hey 
(1996) and Cameron & Abouchar (1991), this level of divergent interpretation fails to provide 
proper guidance for decision-makers. As a result, Pitschas & Priess (2000) and Milloy (2000) both 
conclude that precaution should not be considered part of a growing corpus of binding, enforceable 
world trade law.  
Yet, despite the ambiguity of its wording and the difficulty of precisely ascertaining its 
legal implications, it is clear that that the precautionary principle has been frequently used with 
both practical and normative effects (Cameron and Abouchar 1991a; Hickey and Walker 1995; 
Sands 2003). It is repeatedly invoked by policy makers and found in international law and 
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agreements (Phillips 2001), a symbol of its acceptance as a cornerstone of the sustainable 
development approach and of its importance in environmental law and policy (O’Riordan and 
Jordan 1995; Sands 1995; Sands 2003; Stoett and Gore 2009). 
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (2009) has noted an 
important implication of the struggle over the meaning of the principle, suggesting that how this 
international norm comes to be translated into domestic law and how it influences policy will have 
a critical impact on the ability of innovative biotechnologies to expand world food supplies. The 
suggestion of the FAO has severe implications for developing and underdeveloped countries, 
especially when we examine the effects of climate change on the food security of these countries. 
Developing and underdeveloped countries can ill afford to adopt a formulation of the precautionary 
principle that would stifle innovation and further exacerbate the north-south divide, benefiting the 
wealthier and innovative genetically modified (GM) exporting countries.  
This thesis does not examine the large question of the impact of the principle on food 
security in vulnerable countries, nor does it seek to examine the implications of a strong 
formulation of the principle in developing and underdeveloped countries. Rather, the research 
seeks to understand why a particular interpretation of the principle comes to be adopted and to 
identify the causal pathways through which international norms travel and its ability to shape the 
formulation of the norm at the domestic sphere. The thesis tests whether the traditional 
international relations assumption which suggests that international norms become embedded into 
domestic law though international law will withstand careful scrutiny, and in its place, present an 
alternative explanation for norm diffusion. 
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Problem Statement 
Within the contemporary history of international environmental law and policy, precaution 
has emerged as a fundamentally new general principle to challenge the business as usual 
approaches to decision making in the face of uncertainty. However, a major problem with the 
precautionary principle is that it remains ill-defined, with some authors contending that its strict 
application will negatively affect innovation and the adoption of new technologies (Sunstein 2005; 
Pittinger and Bishop 1999; Hufbauer, Kotschwar, and Wilson 2001).  
A consequence of the lack of definition results is that several variants of the principle are 
in circulation, creating the possibility of policy diffusion by emulation (Jordana, Levi-Faur, and 
Marín 2011) without a clear obligation on countries to enact specific laws that conform to a 
standard interpretation of the principle. In particular, the recent literature tends suggests a range of 
formulations, including weak, moderate and strong versions of the principle, with each formulation 
engendering a particular policy response.  
The lack of definition and the presence of multiple formulations has the potential for 
decision makers taking inconsistent regulatory and environmental management decisions, which 
according to Harding and Fisher (1999), hinders business development and elevates costs. The 
ambiguity associated with the principle and the presence of multiple formulations also opens the 
door to legal disputes through the courts, which can allow the judicial system to shape the 
formulation of the principle, interpreting it differently from the original conception of the decision 
makers. Lack of predictability both in terms of the interpretation that is adopted in any particular 
jurisdiction and the subsequent clarification of the scope and application of the principle create 
high levels of uncertainty and increase transaction costs for industry.   
As a contribution to reducing uncertainty, this thesis sets out to examine why Canada came 
to adopt what is arguably a weak formulation of the precautionary principle and what are the causal 
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pathways that influenced the adoption of this weak formulation. More generally, this thesis aims 
to contribute to our understanding of the different pathways that allow for an international norm 
such as the precautionary principle to travel from the international sphere to domestic policy and 
what effect this has on the formulation of the precautionary principle that is adopted.  
Background 
The precautionary principle, derived from the German word vorsorgeprinzip, emerged 
during the 1980s as a pillar of German environmental policy. It was not until the late 1980s 
(Gundling 1990) that international legal regimes incorporated the principle in a number of 
international treaties (Perrez 2000). The inclusion of the principle in the 1992 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development,  the 1997 Montreal Protocol, and the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety, are evidence that this principle has quietly emerged as an international norm within 
international treaty law concerning the environment (Perrez 2000). The fact that the precautionary 
principle has been invoked by policy makers in various countries is an indication that it is now 
widely regarded as an essential consideration when formulating domestic policy (Goldstein & 
Carruth, 2003; Goklany, 2001).  
 The literature on how international norms become embedded in domestic laws for the most 
part is narrowly focused on international regimes and international treaty law (Rosenau 1995; 
Bernstein and Cashore 2012). This is particularly true of international environmental norms such 
as the precautionary principle and sustainability, where the literature, while acknowledging the 
globalized nature of the international political economy, fails to account for other pathways of 
influence outside of legal instruments and the role of domestic politics. To remedy this narrow 
focus, this thesis adopts Bernstein and Cashore’s framework of multiple pathways from 
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international to domestic policy making and traces the pathways that led to the adoption of a 
particular version of the precautionary principle in Canada.  
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CHAPTER 2. KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
How do norms travel? 
There are several theories posited by international relations and political scientists on the 
mechanisms through which international norms influence and become embedded into domestic 
policy. The traditional approach to understanding norm transfer is found in the diffusion and 
convergence literature, where the term diffusion refers to processes where national governments 
and decision makers voluntarily, agree to adopt and implement a particular policy innovation, by 
drawing on a particular policy model from the international arena (Howlett 2000; Rogers 2003). 
Elkins and Simmons (2005) conceptualize diffusion as a set of mechanisms “characterized by 
interdependent, but uncoordinated, decision making’ where ‘governments are independent in the 
sense that they make their own decisions without cooperation or coercion but interdependent in 
the sense that they factor in the choices of other governments” (p. 35). This understanding gives 
rise to the notion that an examination of policy diffusion should be considered as a specified set of 
mechanisms as opposed to an all-inclusive notion of spread (Levi-Faur 2005; Elkins and Simmons 
2005). 
The diffusion literature suggests that there are multiple mechanisms which may result in 
policy change. These include, but are not limited to such varied processes as “independent but 
similar domestic responses to similar policy problems, negotiation of and compliance with 
multilateral agreements, supranational law-making, hegemonic coercion, intergovernmental 
reinforcement, regulatory competition, persuasion, peer-pressure, learning or imitation, to name 
just a few” (Busch and Jörgens 2005, 862). A narrower typology, proposed by Busch and Jörgens 
(2005) suggests that these can be subdivided into three broad categories of mechanisms: “(1) the 
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co-operative harmonization of domestic practices by means of international legal agreements or 
supranational law; (2) the coercive imposition of political practices by means of economic, 
political or even military threat, intervention or conditionality; and (3) the interdependent, but un-
coordinated diffusion of practices by means of cross-national imitation, emulation or learning” (p. 
862). These categories offer distinctive modes of operation, but all aim to explain why national 
decision makers adopt a particular policy developed outside of the jurisdiction of the adopting 
State.  
Nevertheless, policy diffusion is not without its critics. Howlett and Rayner (2008) 
suggests “that the development of diffusion studies continues to be seriously hindered by a lack of 
clarity about the dependent variable; ‘‘what’’ is being diffused is sometimes lost in the concern 
for ‘‘how’’ diffusion takes place” (p. 386). However, the most convincing criticism of the policy 
diffusion and convergence literature is that once a norm is adopted in the domestic realm, the 
domestic version should be similar to the original formulation found at the international level. In 
the case of the precautionary principle, this is not the case. When compared to the traditional 
approaches such as norm diffusion and emulation, the work of Bernstein and Cashore (2012) offers 
a more sophisticated approach to the translation of policy from the international to the domestic 
levels that can explain different formulations.  
This approach, referred to as the pathways framework and originally designed to explain 
the influence of global forest governance arrangements at the domestic level, suggests four causal 
pathways of influence, (Chapter 3 presents the framework in greater detail). Although a relatively 
novel approach, the pathways framework has already been applied in a number of case studies. 
Hudson (2012) explores the “mechanisms for establishing “Fail-safe Federalism” for forest 
management in the United States and Canada (p. 925). Hudson expands on the usefulness of the 
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pathways framework proposed by Bernstein and Cashore (2012) suggesting that the pathways 
framework is a useful tool for explaining the divergent forest policies between Canada and the US, 
further suggesting that the “pathways arise from increasing international pressures on domestic 
policies that have global implications” (p. 993).  
 Kasa (2013) adopted the pathways framework to examine the factors which led to the 
Brazilian government voluntarily committing to reduce its emissions. Emphasis is placed on the 
role and effect of international actors, but domestic interests are also considered. Finally, the work 
of Gomar, Stringer, and Paavola (2013), examines the co-evolution of regime complexities and 
public policy coherence in the context of international biodiversity governance. These authors 
focus their research on the cluster of biodiversity-related conventions and their implementation in 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean countries. Gomar, Stringer, and Paavola (2013) draw 
a similar observation to that of Kasa (2013) and Hudson (2012). All three of these authors 
conceptualize the pathways as traveling in a top-down manner. 
 Gomar, Stringer, and Paavola (2013) contrast this top-down orientation with the work of 
Goodwin (2013), who proposes a different set of variables that allow for bottom-up pathways of 
influence. The bottom-up approach proposed by Goodwin (2013), and adopted by Gomar, 
Stringer, and Paavola (2013) entail what are referred to as “internal modalities”. These modalities 
consist of the suite of norms and routines governing the manner in which national delegations 
prepare for meetings and how they will participate in the actual working sessions of international 
agreements. Whether top-down or bottom-up all, these approaches suggest a uni-directional path, 
a concept that is examined and challenged in this thesis. 
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Defining Biotechnology 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2005) defines 
biotechnology as “the application of science and technology to living organisms, as well as parts, 
products and models thereof, to alter living or non-living materials for the production of 
knowledge, goods and services” (p. 9). This definition is purposely broad, since it covers all 
modern biotechnology as well as conventional or peripheral undertakings.   
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) agrees with this broad definition by 
defining biotechnology as “any technological application that uses biological systems, living 
organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make or modify products for specific use” (Secretariat of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity 2005, 89). This definition does however embrace medical and 
industrial applications, along with many of the tools and techniques that are conventional in 
agriculture and food production. It is consistent with the definition offered by the FAO`s Glossary 
of biotechnology, which defines biotechnology both broadly as in the CBD and narrowly as “a 
range of different molecular technologies such as gene manipulation and gene transfer, DNA 
typing and cloning of plants and animals” (FAO 2001).  
The Government of Canada, through Canadian Environmental Protection Act (CEPA), 
broadly defines biotechnology as "the application of science and engineering in the direct or 
indirect use of living organisms or parts or products of living organisms in their natural or modified 
forms" (Environment Canada 2000). Thus, within the context of the definitions posited by the 
FAO (2001) and CEPA, Agricultural biotechnology is best understood as “a range of tools that 
scientists employ to understand and manipulate the genetic make-up of organisms for use in the 
production or processing of agricultural products” (FAO 2004). 
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History of the Precautionary Principle and its Status in International Law 
The precautionary principle had its genesis in German law (Cameron and O’Riordan 1994). 
As the Vorsorgeprinzip, the precautionary principle claims significant status in German 
environmental policy (Cameron and Abouchar 1991b). It was first legally recognized 
internationally in the Preamble to the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone 
Layer, in which the Parties to the treaty recognized the necessity of precautionary measures. 
States subsequently recognized the need for a precautionary approach in the series of 
conferences on the North Sea (Sands 2003). During the Second North Sea Conference Ministerial 
Declaration (the London Declaration) in 1987, the principle was referenced three times in Articles 
VII, XV(i) and XVI (i). Since then, the precautionary principle has emerged in several international 
environmental agreements [See table 1], which represents a “complex framework of treaty law and 
custom from which the precautionary principle draws its strength as a mechanism for 
environmental protection and ultimately validates its position as genuine international 
law”(Cameron and Abouchar 1996, 34).  
 
Table 1- International Environmental Agreements which Incorporate the Precautionary 
Principle  
Treaty  Subject  Article  
Vienna Convention (1985)  Ozone depletion  Preamble  
Montreal Protocol (1987)  Ozone depletion  Preamble  
Climate Change Convention (1992)  Climate Change  Article 3, § 3  
Biodiversity Convention (1992)  Biodiversity  Preamble  
LRTAP Sulphur Protocol (1994)  Air Pollution  Preamble  
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Agreement for the Conservation of Africa-
Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds  
Migratory Birds  Article 2  
Straddling Stocks Agreement (1995)  Fish Stocks  Article 5(c); 
Article 6  
SADC Water Protocol (1995)  Water  Preamble  
Mediterranean Hazardous Waste Protocol 
(1996)  
Pollution of Sea  Preamble; Article 
8.3  
Protocol to the London Convention (1996)  Marine Pollution  Article 3  
ACCOBAMS  Cetaceans 
conservation  
Article 2, § 4  
Convention on the Law of Non-
Navigational uses of International 
Watercourses (1996)  
Watercourses  Preamble  
Protocol to MARPOL 73/78 (1997)  Pollution from 
Ships  
Preamble  
Kyoto Protocol (1997)  Climate Change  Preamble  
LRTAP POPs Protocol (1998)  Air Pollution  Preamble  
LRTAP Heavy Metals Protocol (1998)  Air Pollution  Preamble; Annex 
VII.3  
Chemicals Convention (1998)  Hazardous 
Chemicals and 
Pesticides  
Article 14, §3(d); 
Annex 5, 1(e)  
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Agreement Concerning the Creation of a 
Marine Mammal Sanctuary in the 
Mediterranean (1999)  
Marine Mammals  Final Declaration  
Convention on the Protection of the Rhine 
(1999)  
Rhine Protection  Article 4  
Health Protocol (1999)  Water and Health  Article 5(a)  
LRTAP Acidification Protocol (1999)  Air Pollution  Preamble  
Biosafety Protocol (2000)  Biological 
Diversity  
Preamble; Article 
1  
Galapagos Agreement (2000)  Living Marine 
Resources  
Article 5(b)  
Convention on the Conservation and 
Management of Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean (2000)  
Migratory Fish 
Stocks  
Preamble; Article 
5(c); Article 6  
International Convention on the Control of 
Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships 
(2001)  
Pollution from 
Ships  
Preamble  
POPs Convention (2001)  Persistent Organic 
Pollution  
Preamble; Article 
1; Article 8 §9  
Agreement on the Conservation of 
Albatrosses and Petrels (2001)  
Birds Protection  Preamble; Article 
II § 3  
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North-East Pacific Convention (2002)  Marine and Coastal 
Protection  
Article 5 § 6 (a)  
International Convention for the Control 
and Management of Ships Ballast Water 
and Sediments (2004)  
Pollution from 
Ships  
Preamble  
 
Defining the Precautionary Principle 
Differing formulations of the precautionary principle abound (Hickey and Walker 1995; 
Cameron and Abouchar 1991a; Cameron and O’Riordan 1994; Perrez 2000). In general terms, the 
precautionary principle is taken to mean that evidence of harm need not be conclusively 
demonstrated to justify a response to a perceived risk, if necessary, taking immediate measures to 
prevent harm. Scott (2005) notes the precautionary principle is primarily concerned about the 
population at large rather than narrow economic or political groups, although he also notes that 
just what constitutes the ‘public interest’ can be disputed. And yet, underlying such a broad brush 
description is a complex diversity of interpretations centring on “stronger” and “weaker” versions 
of the principle (Sandin et al. 2002; Soule 2000). 
The most commonly cited version of the principle dates from the 1992 United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro. Here, the idea of a 
“precautionary approach” was unambiguously documented in Principle 15: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied 
by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost -
effective measures to prevent environmental degradation (Rio Declaration 1992). 
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The precautionary approach reappears in the international regime which regulates 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. The objective 
of the protocol, as articulated under Article 3, is “to contribute to ensuring an adequate level of 
protection in the safe transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms (LMOs)” (Secretariat 
of the Convention on Biological Diversity 2000, 3). However, while the Cartagena Protocol 
affirms the precautionary approach in its preamble, the preamble has no binding obligation on the 
signatories of the protocol.  
While several authors (Sands 2003; Cameron and Abouchar 1996; Goklany 2009) use the 
concepts ‘precautionary principle’ and a ‘precautionary approach’ interchangeably, the distinction 
between these two phrases was critical to the success of the approval of the final text of the 1992 
Rio Declaration, as evidenced in the 4th session of the UNCED preparatory committee. The US 
Government had threatened to withdraw its support if the term, the ‘precautionary principle’ 
remained within the text of the declaration. Thus, Principle 15 of the (Rio Declaration 1992) speaks 
of the ‘precautionary approach’. Meyer (2007) states that the US Government specifically adopted 
the term ‘approach’ since it was “a reflection of the changes in the environmental policy of the US 
under the Reagan administration in the 1980s” (p. 470). Thus, introducing a distinction between a 
stronger 'principle' and a weaker 'approach' suggests an attempt to cover over this disagreement 
(Iverson and Perrings 2009).   
For example, the publication on the precautionary principle by United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (2005) claims that in most instances, the two 
terms, principle and approach.are closely related. This document notes that in the English version 
of the Rio Declaration, for instance, the word ‘approach’ is used, while the Spanish translation 
contains the word ‘principio’ (p. 23). Mace and Gabriel (1999) suggest that the “the precautionary 
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approach was created as a somewhat more flexible alternative that incorporates socio-economic 
considerations along with the essential requirement of promoting the long-term sustainability of 
natural resources” (p. 65). On the other hand, the precautionary principle places an obligation on 
decision makers to prohibit a particular activity, which is potentially harmful to humans and the 
environment, even if there is uncertainty vis-à-vis the extent of the impacts or causality. This 
suggests that the term ‘precautionary approach’ is merely a diluted version of the principle.  
With stronger and weaker versions  of the precautionary principle and the precautionary 
approach now in circulation, classifications have been introduced for different types. Sandin et al. 
(2002) offer a distinction between argumentative and prescriptive formulations. Argumentative 
forms shape the terms of debates by creating a guiding principle for what arguments are deemed 
legitimate (as in the 1992 Rio Declaration). On the other hand, prescriptive formulations of the 
principle stipulate that if certain preconditions are satisfied vis-à-vis the types of hazard and the 
level of evidence, regulators are duty-bound to follow a specific perscription. These two 
categorization represents another version of the weak/strong approach/principle distinction. 
 Morris & Morris (2000) suggest distinguishing between a strong formulation of the 
principle and a weak formulation. They suggest that the strong formulation requires the cessation 
of activities until there is proof that the activity will not result in harm, while the weak formulation 
states that lack of full certainty is not justification for preventing action that might be harmful. 
McLean & Patterson, (2006) also propose that a convenient way of examining the concept is to 
categorize it into weak and strong versions. 
Soule (2000) supports the strong/weak distinction put forward by Morris & Morris (2000) 
and McLean & Patterson (2006). Soule (2000) advances the notion that the weak formulation of 
the precautionary principle is premised on two core pillars. Firstly, the weak formulation does not 
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“seriously restrict the factors that decision makers can legitimately take into account” (p. 313). 
Secondly, the relative importance of different factors themselves is open, in the sense that 
“regulators do not receive any specific guidance on the relative weighting of any given factor” 
(Soule 2000, p. 313). These distinctions, according to Soule (2000), situates the weak formulation 
of the precautionary principle as a pragmatic principle, since it enables decisions makers to 
contemplate a wide gamut of risk factors (including, but not limited to, economic efficiency) and 
to assess them alongside each other on a case-by-case basis.  Soule (2000) expands on the notion 
of divergent formulations of the principle, differentiating the strong formulation as having two 
main features. First, it is exclusive in scope; in the sense that its only consideration is the 
environmental risks that can result from the policy under consideration. The second criterion is 
based on what Soule (2000) refers to as the ‘determinative’ factor. The strong formulation argues 
that environmental risk is the authoritative factor on which decision making pivots and regulators 
are compelled to act on it to the exclusion of other considerations such as socio-economic factors 
(Soule 2000, p. 318).  
However, Soule (2000) is critical of the strong formulation, arguing that it is obsessively 
narrow and fails to take into account the full range of costs and benefits when calculating risk. He 
refers to the example of genetically-modified pest protected plants (GMPPPs). Soule (2000) 
suggests that the strong formulation would reject GMPPPs, ignoring the fact that current 
environmental practices involving the pervasive use of agrochemicals such as pesticides incur 
substantial environmental costs. Further, Soule (2000) asserts that non-environmental factors - 
such as food supply – should also be considered (p. 324). 
 Sunstein (2005) dismisses the weak versions of the principle as “unobjectionable, even 
banal” (p. 24), while labeling the strong formulations as “incoherent” (p. 14), arguing that the 
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“principle threatened to be paralyzing, forbidding regulation, inaction, and every step in between” 
(p. 14). Sunstein rejects regulation of risks that is premised on either a weak or strong formulations 
of the precautionary principle. Instead, Sunstein (2005) argues for the sensible management of 
risks through education and information, but reserves a place for the precautionary principle only 
in instances where “people face a potentially catastrophic risk to which probabilities cannot be 
assigned” (p. 225). 
In response to the debate about strong and weak formulations of the principle, this thesis 
adopts the categories proposed by Peterson (2006), who builds on the work of Cooney (2004) and 
Wiener (2002). Peterson (2006) proposes an additional category, pointing to the presence of a 
moderate version of the principle, in addition to the strong and weak formulations. Patterson 
(2006) develops these distinctions by referencing the language in several international agreements 
[See Box 1]. 
 
Box 1- Key international formulations of the precautionary principle 
Weak formulations 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992 (Principle 15): In order to protect the 
environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their 
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation. 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992: The Parties should take precautionary 
measures to anticipate, prevent or minimise the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse 
effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
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should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and 
measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the 
lowest possible cost. 
Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the Economic Commission 
for Europe Region, 1990: In order to achieve sustainable development, policies must be based on 
the precautionary principle. … Environmental measures must anticipate, prevent and attack the 
causes of environmental degradation. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, 
lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent 
environmental degradation. 
UN Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992: Noting also that where there is a threat of 
significant reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack of full scientific certainty should not be 
used as a reason for postponing measures to avoid or minimise such a threat. 
Moderate formulations 
Third International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea, Ministerial Declaration, 
1990: The participants … will continue to apply the precautionary principle, that is to take action 
to avoid potentially damaging impacts of substances that are persistent, toxic, and liable to 
bioaccumulate even where there is no scientific evidence to prove a causal link between emissions 
and effects. 
UK Biodiversity Action Plan, Department of the Environment, 1994 (para. 6.8): In line with 
the precautionary principle, where interactions are complex and where the available evidence 
suggests that there is a significant chance of damage to our biodiversity heritage occurring, 
conservation measures are appropriate, even in the absence of conclusive scientific evidence that 
the damage will occur. 
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Strong formulations 
Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle, 1998: When an activity raises threats 
of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some 
cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically. In this context the proponent 
of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof. 
Earth Charter, 2000 (article 6): Prevent harm as the best method of environmental protection 
and, when knowledge is limited, apply a precautionary approach. Take action to avoid the 
possibility of serious or irreversible environmental harm even when scientific knowledge is 
incomplete or inconclusive. Place the burden of proof on those who argue that a proposed activity 
will not cause significant harm, and make the responsible parties liable for environmental harm. 
Adapted:(Peterson 2006b) 
 
 Peterson (2006) argues that the weak version is the least prescriptive, allowing preventive 
measures to be taken in the face of uncertainty but  not requiring them (e.g Rio Declaration 1992; 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (1992). The threshold of 
harm is satisfied when the evidence presented suggests the probability of  the occurrence and the 
gravity of consequences. Some, but not all, weak versions require consideration of the costs of 
precautionary measures. These weak formulations do not preclude balancing of economic benefits 
against the costs. Factors including economic considerations are taken into account and these may 
provide legitimate justifications for delaying action. Under weak formulations, the requirement to 
justify the need for action (the burden of proof) generally falls on those advocating precautionary 
action. No reference is made to liability for future environmental damage (Peterson 2006a).  
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Peterson (2006) suggests that, in moderate versions of the principle, the existence of an 
uncertain threat represents a clear mandate for action, provided that all available evidence suggests 
that a sufficiently serious threat is present. For example, the United Kingdom (UK) Biodiversity 
Action Plan states: 
In line with the precautionary principle, where interactions are complex and where the 
available evidence suggests that there is a significant chance of damage to our biodiversity heritage 
occurring, conservation measures are appropriate, even in the absence of conclusive scientific 
evidence that damage will occur. (Department of the Environment (UK) 1994, 92) 
Usually, there is no requirement for proposed precautionary measures to be assessed 
against other factors such as economic or social costs. The trigger for action may be less rigorously 
defined, for example, as “potential damage”, rather than as “serious or irreversible” damage as in 
the weak version (Peterson 2006a). Liability is not mentioned and the burden of proof generally 
remains with those advocating precautionary action (Cooney 2004; Peterson 2006a). 
In a strong formulation, there is usually no requirement for proposed precautionary 
measures to be assessed against other factors such as economic or social costs. The trigger for 
action may well be less rigorously defined than in other formulations, for example, as “potential 
damage”, rather than as “serious or irreversible” damage as in the weak version. Liability is not 
stated and the burden of proof generally remains with those advocating precautionary action. Thus, 
strong versions of the principle differ from the weak and moderate versions principally in reversing 
the burden of proof. However, strong versions also tend to compel precautionary measures if 
potential harm cannot be ruled out and some strong versions also establish liability for 
environmental harm, which is effectively a strong form of the “polluter pays” principle. For 
example, the Earth Charter (2000) states: “When knowledge is limited apply a precautionary 
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approach …. Place the burden of proof on those who argue that a proposed activity will not cause 
significant harm, and make the responsible parties liable for environmental harm” (The Earth 
Charter Initiative 2000) 
Reversal of the burden of proof requires those proposing an activity to prove that the 
product, procedure or technology is sufficiently “safe” before consent is granted. Necessitating 
proof of “no environmental harm” before any action proceeds presumes public unwillingness to 
accept any environmental risk, even if there are economic or social benefits present (Peterson, 
2006). At the extreme, such a requirement could involve bans and prohibitions on entire classes of 
potentially threatening activities or substances (Cooney, 2005). 
Peterson (2006) sets out a spectrum for the strength of versions by assessing what responses 
they present to the following questions:  
1. What level (threshold) of threat or potential for harm is sufficient to trigger application 
of the principle? 
2. Are the potential threats balanced against other considerations, such as costs or non-
economic factors, in deciding what precautionary measures to implement? 
3. Does the principle impose a positive obligation to act or simply permit action? 
4. Where does the burden of proof rest to show the existence or absence of risk of harm? 
5. Is liability for environmental harm assigned and if so, who bears liability? (Peterson 
2006, p. 471) 
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Table 2 - Formulations of the Precautionary Principle 
 
 Weak Moderate Strong 
What level 
(threshold) of 
threat or potential 
for harm is 
sufficient to trigger 
application of the 
principle? 
Serious, irreversible 
or significant 
The trigger for action may be 
defined less rigorously, for 
example, as ‘potential damage’, 
rather than ‘serious or 
irreversible’ damage 
The 
threshold for 
action varies, 
sometimes 
expressed 
simply as 
‘harm’. 
Are the potential 
threats balanced 
against other 
considerations, 
such as costs or 
non-economic 
factors, in deciding 
what precautionary 
measures to 
implement? 
Economic 
considerations 
(among others) may 
provide legitimate 
grounds for 
postponing action. 
Usually, there are no explicit 
qualifications requiring proposed 
precautionary measures to be 
assessed against factors such as 
economic or social costs. 
No risk is 
acceptable 
Does the principle 
impose a positive 
obligation to act or 
simply permit 
action? 
Scientific 
uncertainty alone or 
the possibility of 
environmental 
damage below the 
threshold level will 
not satisfy the 
threshold test for 
precautionary 
measures. 
The threat of environmental 
damage justifies or requires 
action to address the threat. 
 
Action may not be as different 
from weak versions as they may 
first appear; because 
precautionary measures (action) 
may include ‘wait and see’ 
approaches. However, the 
language is certainly stronger 
and may be suggestive of 
stronger forms of action 
Strong 
versions 
justify or 
require 
precautionary 
measures. 
Immediate 
action is 
required 
where there 
is uncertainty 
Where does the 
burden of proof 
rest to show the 
existence or 
absence of risk of 
harm? 
Liability falls on 
those advocating 
precautionary 
action. 
Liability falls on those 
advocating precautionary action. 
Proponents 
of an activity 
with 
potential for 
harm – 
whether 
serious or 
minor – are 
required to 
prove that the 
product, 
process or 
technology is 
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sufficiently 
‘safe’ before 
approval is 
granted 
Is liability for 
environmental 
harm assigned and 
if so, who bears 
liability? 
No mention is made 
of assignment of 
liability for 
environmental 
harm. 
Liability is not mentioned. 
Proponents 
of the 
activity, 
rather than 
the public 
bears the 
burden of 
proof 
Adapted from Peterson (2006) 
In the Canadian debate, the Royal Society of Canada Expert Panel’s report: Elements of 
Precaution: Recommendations for the Regulation of Food Biotechnology in Canada 
recommended the application of a strong formulation of the precautionary principle as it relates to 
the application of biotechnology and GMOs (The Royal Society of Canada 2001, 204). This report 
was commissioned by Health Canada (HC), the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), and 
Environment Canada (EC). Specifically referencing the relationship between the precautionary 
principle and GM products, the report states that: 
“In general, new technologies should not be presumed safe unless there is a reliable 
scientific basis for considering them safe ... [further] the Panel rejects the use of 
“substantial equivalence” as a decision threshold to exempt new GM products from 
rigorous safety assessments on the basis of superficial similarities because such a 
regulatory procedure is not a precautionary assignment of the burden of proof” (The Royal 
Society of Canada 2001, 206).  
  
 While the literature provides an exhaustive analysis of the various formulations of the 
precautionary principle (Cooney 2004; Goklany 2009; Morris and Morris 2000; Peterson 2006a; 
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Sandin et al. 2002; Wiener, 2002) and establishes that there are at least two and possibly three 
main variants of the precautionary principle in circulation, what is missing is a better understanding 
of why particular countries adopt distinctive versions of the principle. In spite of the Royal 
Society’s recommendations, for example, the Canadian government actually adopted a weak 
version of the principle. Goklany (2009) suggests that the European Union (EU) embraces a 
“strong” formulation of the precautionary principle in biotechnology policies, while the United 
States (US) approach incorporates a moderate version. What is noticeably absent from the 
literature is how to account for these various formulations of the principle, the implications of 
various formulations on commercialization and the enabling environments that give rise to these 
formulations. Chapter 3 presents a framework for understanding the decision to adopt a particular 
version of the precautionary principle and Chapter 4 will use the framework to explain the 
Canadian decision to adopt a weak version.  
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
The pathways framework represents a unique way of analyzing complex global 
environmental governance arrangements; with specific focus on distinguishing multiple causal 
logics and pathways of influence in order to give explanation to the domestic outcomes of global 
environmental governance. At present, as its creators acknowledge, the pathways constitute a 
framework, in the sense of “the most general set of variables that an institutional analyst may want 
to use to examine a diversity of institutional settings”  (Ostrom 2010, 6).  In order to use the 
pathways framework to analyze a particular case, it is necessary to transform it into a theory which 
sets out to “explain diverse outcomes and how they relate to one another” (ibid.) by clearly 
specifying independent and dependent variables. Ostrom (2010) notes that the “terms frameworks, 
theories, and models are used interchangeably by many scholars” (p. 6). Nonetheless, we follow 
Ostrom in distinguishing between these concepts, allowing this research to “use these concepts in 
a nested manner to range from the most general to the most precise set of assumptions made by a 
scholar” (p. 6).  
This chapter argues that, in the case of an international norm such as the precautionary 
principle, a pathways theory provides a superior way of explaining how and why that norm 
becomes part of domestic law and policy than the more usual appeal to “regime effectiveness” 
theory. In particular, a pathways theory can explain not just whether a norm will be incorporated 
into domestic law but also what version of the norm gets incorporated. As shown in the previous 
chapter, this part of the explanation will be critical in understanding the role of the precautionary 
principle in domestic law and policy.    
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Analytical Framework: Pathways Framework 
 Hickey & Walker (1995) and Sands (2003) observe that since the 1997 Montreal protocol 
and the 1992 Rio Declaration, several countries have chosen to adopt and incorporate the 
precautionary principle, an international norm, into their domestic environmental policies. As a 
result, this norm has become an essential component of environmental law and risk regulation, in 
several jurisdictions, such as the US (Kannan 2007), Canada (The Royal Society of Canada 2001), 
Australia (Harding and Fisher 1999), Germany (O’Riordan 1994), France (Rochere Dutheil de la 
1999), and the EC (Harding and Fisher 1999). 
 Bernstein (2000) defines norms as patterns of actions or behavior that are appropriate and 
accepted. Alldén (2009), building on the work of Farrell (2001), suggests that norms are “inter-
subjective beliefs about the social and natural world which define actors, their situations and the 
possibilities of action” (p. 17). Finnemore & Sikkink (2002) offer a narrower view by defining 
norms as “standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” (p. 251).  
Drawing on the international relations perspective, Khagram, Riker, & Sikkink (2002) 
define a norm as the “shared expectations or standards of appropriate behavior accepted by states 
and intergovernmental organizations that can be applied to states, intergovernmental 
organizations, and/or non-state actors of various kinds” (p. 14). The definition offered by 
Khagram, Riker, & Sikkink (2002) represents a global framing of norms and represents how this 
concept is to be understood throughout this thesis. This research acknowledges that “there is a 
tendency to narrow non-state actors’ functions by limiting their activity to a single level of 
governance, by confining certain roles to the realm of traditional state and institutional actors, by 
pre-assigning normative labels to them” (Cowles 2003, 103). Other critics, such as Rayner and 
McNutt (2012) note that the term non-state actors is broadly used to describe actors such as large 
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and small international organizations, transnational corporations, and a variety of non-
governmental organizations.  
 How does an international norm become domestic law?  Traditionally, the route has been 
described as following a pathway that passes first through the incorporation of the norm into 
international law and, from there, into domestic law through enabling legislation and court 
judgments. Our discussion of the precautionary principle suggests two problems with the 
traditional account. First, if the account is taken to mean that there has to be a single agreed upon 
interpretation of the principle that is then embodied in an international treaty, ratified by signatories 
and implemented in a uniform way around the world, the precautionary principle does not fit the 
description. However, as critics of this narrow, formal-legal version of an international regime 
have pointed out, hardly any other international norm or principle fits the description either.  
 Consequently, critics of the formal-legal versions of regime theory, e.g. Sands (2003), have 
proposed more informal ways that international norms become domestic law and policy. Sands 
suggests that under international law, norms such as the precautionary principle can amount to 
customary international law if they are enshrined in international treaties and are part of the 
decisions of international courts and tribunals and the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Sands 
(2003) argues that norms crystallize into customs when there is a consistent acceptance of a norm 
by states, either through its incorporation into treaties, ratifications, its application in domestic 
courts or by official statements by government officials. Further Sands (2003) states that an 
additional way of discerning custom is opinio juris, which is revealed though the actions of States 
that adhere to a norm as though they are bound to it. These actions must however be consistent 
over an extended period of time.  
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Thus, in the case of the precautionary principle, several commentators (Goklany 2001; 
Goldstein and Carruth 2003; Cameron, Jordan, and O’Riordan 2001; O’Riordan and Jordan 1995; 
Perrez 2000; The Royal Society of Canada 2001) suggests that owing to the consistency with 
which the precautionary principle has been invoked in international agreements and numerous 
court cases, the precautionary principle can be considered as amounting to customary international 
law (Tollefson and Thornback 2007). According to Sands (2003) international customs are binding 
on States, even if they are not signatories to international treaties and agreements that contain the 
norm. 
This more informal route from norm to policy is a distinct improvement over the narrow, 
formal-legal version. It explains how precaution could become an accepted feature of law and 
policy in a variety of different countries and underlines the role of interpretation in creating 
different versions of the principle. However, this more informal approach raises the second 
problem of trying to follow a norm through international law and into domestic policy. If there is 
not a single, legally accepted version of the principle, what is to stop a country from adopting a 
markedly different version from other countries, perhaps to gain an unfair advantage in trade or 
security, and continuing to claim that they are in compliance with their international obligations? 
The identity of the principle itself now seems to be in question, a problem that arose in connection 
with the international relations and globalization literature that primarily accounts for norm 
transfer through the “policy diffusion” mechanisms (Alldén 2009; Checkel 1997; Covadonga and 
Gilardi 2009; Fabrizio and Fuglister 2008; Levi-Faur 2005; Skogstad 2000). As critics pointed out 
(Howlett and Rayner 2008) “what” is being diffused is rarely clearly stated and  in the case of the 
precautionary principle, the literature clearly shows that there are (Cameron, Jordan, and 
 29 
 
O’Riordan 2001; Sandin et al. 2002; Sunstein 2005), multiple formulations of the principle at work 
(Freestone and Hey 1996; Freestone 1991; Sands 2003; Sunstein 2005).  
 Bernstein and Cashore note that, in response to this criticism, proponents of a broader or 
more informal process of incorporating international norms into domestic policy generally shifted 
their focus from the identity of the norm to the effectiveness of the policies that are carried out in 
its name. In other words, what matters about an international regime is not whether countries have 
signed up to and ratified a treaty but, whether they were able to solve the problems for which the 
regime was established.  
 This is not to claim that the traditional activities of treaty negotiation and regime creation 
are irrelevant to effectiveness. Skjærseth, Stokke, & Wettestad (2006), using regime effectiveness 
theory, examine the interplay between international institutions based on soft and hard law and 
note that “hard law instruments are subject to more thorough negotiation and preparation which is 
likely to improve the quality of implementation and compliance”. However, they caution that this 
does not necessarily result in more effective governance.  The danger, as Stokke and Vidas (1996)  
suggest is  that, within the study of international law, ‘effectiveness’ is still conceived as referring 
to “the legal status of a rule meaning that it is legally binding upon those addressed by it; or, when 
linked to implementing the rule, to the impact on the relevant factual situation” (Stokke and Vidas 
1996, 14), incorporating an assumption that hard law instruments are capable of transmitting a 
particular international norm and constraining the behavior of the parties to that particular regime 
generating that norm.   
Avoiding this assumption about effectiveness while attempting to preserve the idea of an 
identifiable norm or value moving from international to domestic law forms the point of departure 
for the pathways framework, whose fundamental innovation is the idea of multiple additional 
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pathways beyond international law itself. Specifically, as noted by Bernstein & Cashore, the work 
of Skjærseth, Stokke, & Wettestad (2006) suggests that international norms are effective if they 
“strengthen hard law rules and/or encourage states to sign up to hard law treaties” (Bernstein and 
Cashore 2012, 588). However, Bernstein & Cashore suggest that this assumptions “truncates the 
possible influence of norms via other pathways, which remain poorly understood” (p. 588). 
Consequently, Bernstein & Cashore  observe that “domestic influences cannot be studied simply 
by looking at the international rules pathway” (p. 587), especially since the failure of regime 
compliance and effectiveness arguments results from the single pathway argument that is built on 
“hard law treaty provisions” (Bernstein and Cashore 2012, 586). This thesis uses the term 
‘pathway’ as a metaphor to explain how a norm travels from point A to point B.  
Bernstein & Cashore’s (2012) innovative suggestion of additional causal pathways rests 
on the assumption that we live in a world where the neo-realist paradigm, which contends that the 
state is the central actor, is no longer credible (Keohane 1986). There are now a growing number 
of non-state actors, who are critical to global governance, many of whom have the ability to 
influence the policy agenda of international and domestic politics.  
Bernstein & Cashore (2012) observe that these actors are able to influence domestic politics 
through “legal, non-legal, governmental and non-governmental arrangements” (p. 586).  
Bernstein & Cashore (2012) remark that the framework “distinguishes the actors and 
institutions involved in governance arrangements that attempt to influence domestic policy from 
the pathways of influence themselves” (p. 589). The framework also allows for meticulous analysis 
by distinguish “transnational actors … as agents of change” from “the rules and norms that 
institutions embody, in order to illustrate how agents interact with rules and norms to influence 
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domestic policy” (p. 589). Hudson (2012) suggests that the “pathways arise from increasing 
international pressures on domestic policies that have global implications” (p. 993).  
By focusing on transnational actors and their efforts to move international norms into 
domestic law and policy, Bernstein and Cashore reveal that there are three additional pathways in 
addition to the international rules path, through which actors, institutions and interests influence 
domestic and firm-level policy change. Specifically, they observe that “transnational actors and 
international institutions influence policies by bringing norms generated or promoted in the 
international sphere into the domestic political arena” (Bernstein and Cashore 2000, 71).  The 
pathways framework identifies four causal pathways through which transnational pressures shape 
and transforms national policy. In addition to international rules, these consist of international 
norms and discourse, markets and direct access. 
 
Figure 1 - Pathways Framework 
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 International Norms and Discourse 
The first pathway, international norms and discourse, “effectively involves transnational 
actors engaging in symbolic or information campaigns at the international level for the sole 
purpose of changing domestic governance” (Bernstein and Cashore 2000, 323). Bernstein & 
Cashore (2012) observe that norms and discourses are able to “define and regulate appropriate 
domestic behavior” (p. 591). They suggest that this pathway operate through both logic of 
appropriateness (norm-guided without regard to consequences) and a logic of consequences 
(which rests on utilitarian calculations). Bernstein & Cashore (2012) make a distinction between 
these two concepts by noting that in instances where norms are viewed as regulatory rules with 
repercussions, when violated, actors weigh the cost of compliance or noncompliance with these 
“prescribed or proscribed behavior” (Bernstein and Cashore 2012, 519). 
Importantly, Bernstein & Cashore (2000) suggest that “agents of change along this path, 
whether activists, scientists or coalitions of business leaders, often explicitly aim to reframe or 
change the discourse around a problem or to create or reinforce new normative commitments” (p. 
82). An example of this change, as noted by Bernstein & Cashore (2012) is the inclusion of 
aboriginal rights in domestic policy, which resulted in policy change in counties such as Canada 
and Brazil. Bernstein & Cashore (2000) observe that although these norms are not binding on 
States, they can “alter state identities and interests” (p. 324).  
Further, Bernstein & Cashore (2012) observe that these norms can have a “powerful 
normative role . . . primarily through moral suasion and communicative action rather than coercion 
or enforcement” (p. 324), but success is hinged on the “moral vulnerability” of the target state (p. 
325). The authors suggests that “the importance of learning networks suggests success along this 
pathway is more probable when the fourth pathway (direct access) is also travelled” (p. 592) and 
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this “path is more dependent on a country's concern for reputation than on its place in the 
international political economy (globalization)” (Bernstein and Cashore 2000, 82). 
Like Bernstein & Cashore (2012), this thesis is interested in the purposeful actions by 
international actors, whose primary objective is the transfer and subsequent adoption of norms. As 
such, Bernstein & Cashore (2012) reference the work Keck & Sikkink (1998), who suggest that 
transnational actors follow a sequence of tactics when encouraging States to heed a particular 
international norm. Keck & Sikkink note that transnational actors “carry and re-frame ideas, insert 
them in policy debates, pressure for regime formation, and enforce existing international norms”. 
Keck & Sikkink propose that their typology of tactics that transnational actors utilize in their 
attempts at “persuasion, socialization, and pressure” includes: information, symbolic, leverage and 
accountability politics (p. 16). Additionally, the authors suggest that “persuasion and socialization 
often involve not just reasoning with opponents, but bringing pressure, arm-twisting, encouraging 
sanctions, and shaming” (p. 16).    
Keck and Sikkink (1998) draw attention to the “boomerang effect, which curves around 
local state indifference and repression to put foreign pressure on local elites” (p. 200). However, 
Bernstein & Cashore suggest that this argument limits the impact of domestic policy-making 
structures and networks. As a consequence, Bernstein & Cashore  cite the work of Acharya (2004) 
to show that global norms, [such as the precautionary principle] can be facilitated by domestic 
structures. Acharya (2004) proposes a “theory of localization in which norm-takers perform acts 
of selection, borrowing, and modification in accordance with a preexisting normative framework 
to build congruence between that and emerging global norms” (p. 269).  
Finally, Bernstein & Cashore offer the following hypotheses:  
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(1) “Strategies for change based on International Norms and Discourse depend on the moral 
vulnerability of the target state or firm”,  
(2) “Success depends on resonance with domestic ideology, culture and broader policy 
goals, not on targeting particular actors or domestic policy networks” and “The importance of 
learning networks suggests success along this pathway is more probable when the fourth pathway 
(direct access) is also travelled” (p. 592) 
International rules  
The logic of the second pathway, international rules, rests on the assumption that since 
international rules are binding on States, rules create what Franck (1990) refers to as a downward 
pull. These binding treaties include international trade agreements, international law and policies 
designed by the international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the WB - which often times impose conditionalities upon the signatories of loan agreements such 
as environmental protection and good governance. Bernstein and Cashore (2012) suggest that 
although international rules often times do not result in compliance by States, this pathway still 
impacts the shape and form of domestic policies. They suggest that international agreements are 
only able to influence policy at the domestic level when the party in question is bound to a 
particular international agreement.  
 Bernstein & Cashore (2000) allude to the work of Zürn (1998), who indicate that the 
international rules pathway is constructed by the collective action of transnational agents through 
the mechanisms of treaty diplomacy and by directly engaging in the construction of international 
rules. Further, Bernstein & Cashore (2012) posits that non-state actors at both the domestic and 
international level can activate this pathway in instances of noncompliance. Actors can apply 
significant pressure on governments by publically acknowledging instances of noncompliance or 
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“press governments to launch disputes against other countries that do not fulfill their obligations” 
(p.  591). Bernstein & Cashore (2012) hypothesize that “agreements on international rules with 
strong compliance mechanisms are more likely when such agreements reflect rules or processes 
already under way domestically owing to interaction with other pathways” (p. 591) 
The market  
According to Bernstein & Cashore (2012) this path “encompasses processes or tactics that 
attempt to manipulate, work with or leverage markets to create domestic policy change” (p. 593). 
These actions can range from boycott campaigns, conducted with the aim of affecting consumers, 
producers, suppliers and government to using the media to create negative publicity.  Hudson 
(2012) mentions that “this pathway may directly bypass domestic politics since consumers drive 
the government’s choice to change its policies”.  
For agents choosing to employ this pathway, an important pillar of success rests on the 
ability of actors to convince and influence the behavior of consumers. That is, success will depend 
on whether “transnational actors to convince consumers of the need to change the target's 
detrimental policies” (Bernstein and Cashore 2000, 77). The strategies employed along this 
pathway can range from education, mass media coverage, moral and/or normative arguments, and 
can also include the intentional targeting of suppliers and distributors who operate in the local 
sphere (Bernstein and Cashore 2000). Also, Bernstein & Cashore (2000) suggest that suppliers and 
distributors are disposed to supporting these “boycotts or risk being boycotted themselves” (p. 77) 
The authors suggest that an example of the pathway can be seen in the forestry sector, 
where forest certification systems serve as ‘carrots and sticks’, where adherence to international 
standards results in market access, firm recognition and price premiums, while failure to 
implement results in negative attention. The ability to influence domestic outputs along this 
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pathway pivots on the target State’s dependence on foreign markets and the ability to successfully 
influence consumer behavior. Moral suasion is not employed along this path, instead, coercion is 
used or threatened. As a result, while the use of boycotts can have short-term success, Bernstein 
& Cashore (2000) observe that “long-term efforts require more enduring forms of non-state 
authority” and “normative change is unlikely as a result solely of direct market pressure” (p. 593). 
An important consideration is that the use “of market mechanisms is more likely to produce 
policy change when combined with elements of other pathways, especially when institutions are 
able to generate their own legitimate authority, as in the case of some third-party certification 
systems” (Bernstein and Cashore 2012, 593). 
Direct access to domestic policy-making processes pathway 
The fourth and final pathway: direct access, involves the deliberate efforts by international 
and domestic non-state actors to participate in the domestic policy creation process. Bernstein & 
Cashore (2000) suggest that this is an attempt to internalize an external influence but these attempts 
must not be viewed as an effort to interfere in the sovereign affairs of a State. The direct access 
pathway results in transnational agents engaging in international learning and training on how to 
bring about environmental, social and economic change.  
Financial and human resources are also leveraged to assist local actors, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), grassroots organizations and environmental non-governmental 
organization (ENGOs) or aid in their creation. The focus of this capacity enhancement outreach is 
to “shift the balance of power in domestic policy processes and provide access to often 
marginalized or disempowered organizations” (Bernstein and Cashore 2012, 594). 
 Bernstein & Cashore  argue that “direct access through enforcement/implementation 
strategies can yield swift and immediate results, as long as international actors and organizations 
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do not make additional requirements to which the domestic government does not agree” (p. 594). 
They also suggest that this tactic is potentially a significant driver of policy change since, unlike 
other methods of influence, it strengthens the policy objective of the domestic government, 
“which, owing to a lack of capacity and resources, it is unable to enforce or implement” (p. 594). 
Bernstein & Cashore (2000) suggest that transnational groups are required to have in depth 
knowledge of domestic policy networks if they are to succeed along this path.  
 
Research methodology 
This research proposes to utilize a case study approach of Canada. According to Yin 
(2003), a case study can be defined as “an empirical investigation of a contemporary phenomenon 
that includes its everyday context, particularly when the boundaries between the phenomenon and 
context are not clear” (p. 23). Case studies are often utilized when an investigation of contextual 
factors is required to fully understand the phenomenon. Yin (2003) expands on the usefulness of 
case studies by contending that case studies are inherently valuable when studying phenomena 
where there will be more variables of interest than data points.  
Data Sources 
Yin (2003) suggests that the characteristic of a good thesis that employs a case study 
research is the use of multiple data sources. These sources may consist of, but are not limited to: 
documentation, archival records, interviews, physical artifacts, direct observations, and 
participant-observation (Yin 2003). No particular source has an absolute advantage over the others; 
rather, the employment of multiple sources complements each other when used in tandem, each 
offering strengths and weaknesses (Yin 1994). 
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As such, and in order to augment data credibility (Yin 2003), the sources utilized  by this 
thesis are documentation and archival records. Specifically, this thesis examined peer reviewed 
journals, scholarly articles, academic publications; online news media, international and Canadian 
reports, parliamentary records, federal government records and reports, and archived documents. 
Further, since the pathways framework had not previously offered an outcome, the findings 
and analysis of this thesis will provide an opportunity to advance the framework and test it within 
a unique policy space. 
Measuring Policy Change 
This thesis measures policy change by focusing “mainly on policy decisions (statutes, 
regulations and policy statements that carry the force of the state)” (Bernstein and Cashore 2000, 
70). As note by Bernstein and Cashore (2000), actors operating in the domestic and international 
sphere transport norms generated in the international sphere into the domestic political economy.  
Evidence of this proposition is exampled in the transmission of international norms such 
as the trade in endangered species or hazardous substances, international human rights and 
international labor standards. Within the context of this thesis, changes are not limited to form of 
“new policy structures or new laws, or attempts to de-legitimize former practices” (p, 71), they 
also manifest themselves in the decisions by firms faced with internal and external pressure to 
change.  
As such, this research suggest that while activity along all four paths can result in change, 
“the conditions of successful change differ along each path, indicating different logics of 
influence” (Bernstein and Cashore 2000, 71) 
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Chapter 4. SITUATING THE CANADIAN FORMULATION OF THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
As noted in Chapter 2, this thesis adopts the criteria outlined by Peterson (2006), who sets 
out a spectrum for the strength of versions by assessing what responses to questions outlined in 
Table 2. Based on the criteria, the following represents the various formulations of the principle 
found within the Canadian environmental landscape. These include the formulations found at 
federal (national legislations) and provincial levels, including agreements among provinces and 
the Canadian Discussion Document on the precautionary approach/principle.  
 
The Precautionary Principle and Canadian Provinces 
The Canadian province of Nova Scotia is the only Canadian jurisdiction to include the 
words precautionary principle within its environmental protection legislation. The Nova Scotia 
Environment Act 1994-95 states that “the precautionary principle will be used in decision-making 
so that where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, the lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation”1.  
A second province, New Brunswick, while not including the words ‘precautionary 
principle’, does include elements of the principle in its legislation. Specifically, section 2 of the 
New Brunswick Clean Air Act states that “scientific information should be a fundamental part of 
the decision-making process in the administration of this Act and the regulations, but lack of full 
scientific certainty should not delay or deter the implementation of measures to prevent the release 
                                                 
 
1 Nova Scotia Environment Act, 1994-95, c. C.1 
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of contaminants or the spread of contamination where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage to the environment”2. 
The province of Ontario, while not including the principle in its environmental legislation, 
does include it at a departmental level. In particular, it is incorporated in its Statements of 
Environmental Values (SEVs). The Ministry of Environment’s SEV states that the ministry is 
committed to “exercising a precautionary approach in its decision making” (Government of 
Ontario 2013a). However, it is important to note that the Ministry of Natural Resources does not 
include the word ‘precaution,’ opting instead for an “exercise caution and special concern for 
natural values in the face of uncertainty” (Government of Ontario 2013b). 
Environmental Harmonization Accord 
 In January 1998, Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (not including 
Quebec), adopted the Canada-wide Accord on Environmental Harmonization. The Accord was 
developed with the intention of crafting consistent environmental measures and to apply shared 
environmental management principles, one of which is the precautionary principle. Specifically, 
Principle 2 of the Accord states that “where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
environmental damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation (precautionary principle)” 
(Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment 1998a). 
 Further, the Accord provides for sub-agreements to be developed in the area of 
environmental management. These sub-agreements included the Canada-wide Environmental 
Standards Sub-agreement and the Sub-agreement on Environmental Assessment. However, while 
                                                 
 
2 New Brunswick Clean Air Act, S.N.B. 1997, c. C-52 
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the Accord supports the precautionary principle, Principle 3.1.2 of the Canada-wide 
Environmental Standards Sub-agreement weakens the commitment to the principle by utilizing 
prerequisites for the application of the standards, such as “Canada-wide standards will be based 
on sound science and the evaluation of risk to human health and the environment” and “Measures 
developed to attain agreed-upon standards will recognize environmental and socio-economic 
considerations”(Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment 1998a). 
 Additionally, the Sub-agreement on Environmental Assessment fails to mention the 
precautionary principle; instead it chooses to support other principles such as transparency and 
public accountability, effectiveness, efficiency and certainty (Canadian Council of Ministers of the 
Environment 1998b). 
 
Government of Canada Discussion Document Discussion Document on the Precautionary 
Approach/Principle 
In 2001, the Government of Canada published a discussion document on the precautionary 
approach/principle. Participating in the discussion document process were Agriculture and Agri-
Food Canada, Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 
Environment Canada, Finance Canada, Health Canada, Industry Canada, Justice Canada, Natural 
Resources Canada, Privy Council Office, Transport Canada and Treasury Board Secretariat 
(Environment Canada 2001). 
The discussion document was designed with the intention of “inform and raise awareness 
among stakeholder groups about the precautionary approach/principle and the draft framework … 
gauge the reaction of stakeholders…[and] test the guiding principles” (Environment Canada 
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2001). The document outlined five principles which focused on the precautionary principle and 
suggested that precautionary measures should be:  
 “Subject to reconsiderations based on the evolution of science, technology and society’s 
chosen level of protection; 
 Proportional to the potential severity of the risk being addressed and to society’s chosen 
level of protection 
 Non-discriminatory and consistent with measures taken in similar circumstances; 
 Cost-effective, with the goal of generating an overall net benefit for society at least cost 
and efficiency in the choice of measures; and 
 Least trade restrictive” (Fuller, Myers, and Vanderzwaag 2002; Environment Canada 
2001). 
The discussion document, while acknowledging the importance and role of the principle, 
supports a weak formulation of the principle. First the document fails to clearly address and 
appropriate the burden of proof in the decision making process. Second, concerning the burden of 
proof, the document states that “the responsibility for producing the information base (burden of 
proof) may be assigned …[and] the scientific information base and responsibility for producing it 
may shift as the knowledge evolves” (Environment Canada 2001, emphasis added). Third, the 
discussion document notes that “Sound scientific information and its evaluation must be the basis 
for applying the precautionary approach, particularly with regard to (i) the decision to act or not to 
act” (Environment Canada 2001, sec. 3.3). This criterion weakens the principle as the 
determination of what constitutes a sound science approach is determining by government.   
Finally, the discussion document emphasizes the importance of decision makers adopting cost-
benefit approach in determining acceptability of risks. In particular, the document notes that in 
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cases where decision makers are required to take urgent action, at some level “ decision making 
should identify potential costs and benefits as explicitly and as soon as possible, and distinguish 
what risk the public is prepared to accept on the basis of sound and reasonable, albeit incomplete, 
scientific evidence” (Environment Canada 2001, sec. 2.3). Critically, the document makes the 
assumption that precautionary principle acts as a barrier to innovation or technological change. 
The document states that using the use of cost effect measures “can ensure that society receives 
net benefits from decision making, and that the precautionary approach is not used as an 
unnecessary or unintentional barrier to innovation or technological change” (Environment Canada 
2001, sec. 3.10) 
In addition, the document also notes that when whatever instrument is used in addressing risks 
or the potential for risks, the least trade restrictive measure should be applied. The inclusion of the 
least trade restrictive criteria subordinates environmental and societal concerns to the least 
common denominator of trade arrangements.   
Canadian Environmental Legislation 
References to versions of the precautionary principle are contained within several key pieces of 
Canadian legislation. These include the Canadian Environmental Protection Act3 (CEPA), the 
Oceans Act4, the Species at Risk Act5 (SARA), the Pest Control Products Act6 (PCPA) and the 
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act7 (CEAA).  The principle is articulated in the preambles 
to CEPA, SARA and the Oceans Act. It is also included in the purpose section of CEAA and as a 
                                                 
 
3 S.C. 1999 c.33 
4 S.C. 1996, c.31 
5 S.C. 2002 c.29 
6 S.C. 2002, c. 28 
7 S.C. 2012, c. 19, s. 52 
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mandatory strategic principle in the Oceans Act. The manner in which the precautionary principle 
is expressed in these legislations varies and is an indication that there is no uniformed definition 
of the principle (Table 3).  
 
Table 3 - Canadian Legislation utilizing the precautionary principle 
Legislation Formulation   
CEPA “Whereas the Government of Canada is committed to implementing the 
precautionary principle that, where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation” 
SARA “the Government of Canada is committed to conserving biological diversity 
and to the principle that, if there are threats of serious or irreversible damage 
to a wildlife species, cost-effective measures to prevent the reduction or loss 
of the species should not be postponed for a lack of full scientific certainty” 
PCPA “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent adverse health impact or environmental degradation” 
CEAA Whereas the Government of Canada is committed to implementing the 
precautionary principle that, where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation” 
Oceans 
Act  
“WHEREAS Canada promotes the wide application of the precautionary 
approach to the conservation, management and exploitation of marine 
resources in order to protect these resources and preserve the marine 
environment” 
Sources: Oceans Act (1996), CEPA (1999), SARA (2002), PCPA (2002), CEAA (2012) 
 
 
In addition to the general observation that the principle appears in the preamble of most of the 
statutes rather than the body, using the criteria set out by Peterson (2006) allow us to determine 
whether a particular formulation is weak, strong or moderate. As outlined in Table 2 (p. 22), the 
criteria used to ranks the various formulations are as follows:  
 the level of harm needed to trigger the principle,  
 whether the principle is balanced against other considerations e.g. cost,  
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 whether the formulation imposes an obligation to act,  
 where the burden of proof resides and  
 whether liability is assigned when there is environmental harm.  
Using these criteria, the various expressions of the principle included in Canadian environmental 
legislation were examined in order to determine whether they could be classified as weak, 
moderate or strong.  
 
Table 4 –Situating the Precautionary Principle in Canadian Legislation 
     
 
 CEPA SARA 
PCPA CEAA Oceans 
Act 
What level 
(threshold) of 
threat or 
potential for 
harm is 
sufficient to 
trigger 
application of 
the principle? 
Weak- Serious, irreversible 
or significant 
     
Moderate - Trigger for action 
may be defined less 
rigorously, for example, as 
‘potential damage’, rather 
than ‘serious or irreversible’ 
damage 
     
Strong The threshold for 
action varies, sometimes 
expressed simply as ‘harm’ 
     
Are the 
potential 
threats 
balanced 
against other 
considerations, 
such as costs 
or non-
economic 
factors, in 
deciding what 
precautionary 
measures to 
implement? 
Weak - Economic 
considerations (among 
others) may provide 
legitimate grounds for 
postponing action 
     
Moderate - Usually, there are 
no explicit qualifications 
requiring proposed 
precautionary measures to be 
assessed against factors such 
as economic or social costs 
     
Strong -No risk is acceptable      
Does the 
principle 
Weak - Scientific uncertainty 
alone or the possibility of 
     
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impose a 
positive 
obligation to 
act or simply 
permit action? 
environmental damage below 
the threshold level will not 
satisfy the threshold test for 
precautionary measures 
Moderate - The threat of 
environmental damage 
justifies or requires action to 
address the threat. 
Action may not be as 
different from weak versions 
as they may first appear; 
because precautionary 
measures (action) may 
include ‘wait and see’ 
approaches. However, the 
language is certainly stronger 
and may be suggestive of 
stronger forms of action 
     
Strong - Strong versions 
justify or require 
precautionary measures. 
Immediate action is required 
where there is uncertainty 
     
Where does 
the burden of 
proof rest to 
show the 
existence or 
absence of risk 
of harm? 
Weak 
Burden of proof falls on 
those advocating 
precautionary action or not 
mentioned 
     
Moderate - Liability falls on 
those advocating 
precautionary action. 
     
Strong - Proponents of an 
activity with potential for 
harm – whether serious or 
minor – are required to prove 
that the product, process or 
technology is sufficiently 
‘safe’ before approval is 
granted 
     
Is liability for 
environmental 
harm assigned 
and if so, who 
bears liability? 
Weak - Liability is not 
assigned 
     
Moderate - Liability is not 
assigned 
     
Strong – Liability is assigned 
on those responsible for 
environmental harm 
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First, all of the Canadian environmental legislations listed in Table 5 (p. 76), requires that 
threshold needed to trigger the principle falls within the weak category. Similarly, none of the 
legislation reverses the burden of proof on the proponents of an activity nor does it assign liability 
for environmental harm on those responsible. With the exception of the Oceans Act, all of the other 
legislation requires precautionary measures to be assessed against factors such as economic and 
non-economic factors. In the case of the Oceans Act, while this piece of legislation does not state 
that potentially harmful actions are balanced against other considerations, the balancing of interests 
can be implied in the phrase “wide application”.  
Additionally, within all of the legislation under consideration, the level of threat or 
potential threat that must exist in order to trigger the application of the principle is captured under 
the heading of ‘serious or irreversible damage’ and none of the legislation requires a clear 
commitment to act or to permit action in the absence of certainty about such damage. 
In conclusion, the legislative and regulatory approach embraced by Canada embodies a 
weak version of the precautionary principle:  
1. The threshold of threat or potential for harm is used to sufficiently trigger the principle 
is “serious or irreversible harm” (Privy Council Office 2003). 
2. Potential threats are balanced against Canadians’ social, environmental and economic 
values and priorities (Privy Council Office 2003; CEPA 1999; PCPA 2006). 
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3. The principle requires the need for a decision, but does not impose a positive obligation 
to act; it simply permits action but does not indicate what actions should be taken (Privy 
Council Office 2003). 
4. Assignment of the burden of proof is not mentioned in the Privy Council Office 
framework document. CEPA is also unclear, stating under ‘burden of proof’ that “The 
offence alleged in an environmental protection action and the resulting significant harm 
is to be proved on a balance of probabilities” (CEPA 1999, 29). 
5. There is no federal legislation where liability for environmental harm is clearly and 
unambiguously assigned. Liability issues are to be determined by the relevant judicial 
instrument.  
 
The next chapter explores how Canada came to adopt this weak version of precautionary 
principle by exploring the pathway[s] that the principle used as it travelled from the international 
to the Canadian domestic level. 
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Chapter 5. PATHWAYS TO PRECAUTION 
The International Norms and Discourse Pathway 
Introduction 
The international norms and discourse pathway involves “explicit efforts at dialogue and/or 
participation in formal and informal international gatherings or conferences” (Bernstein and 
Cashore 2012, 592), as well as efforts by local actors and international actors at reframing and 
reconstructing “international norms to fit with local norms or to reinforce local beliefs or 
institutions” (Bernstein and Cashore 2012, 592). Lacking a legally binding international agreement 
that commits states to action, transnational actors use the international norms and discourse 
pathway by “engaging in symbolic or information campaigns at the international level for the sole 
purpose of changing domestic governance” (Bernstein and Cashore 2000, 323). To achieve their 
goal, “agents of change along this path, whether activists, scientists or coalitions of business 
leaders, often explicitly aim to reframe or change the discourse around a problem or to create or 
reinforce new normative commitments” (Bernstein and Cashore 2000 p. 82).  
Accordingly, this section of the thesis examines the attempts by various international actors 
to mobilize action around the discourse on the precautionary principle, and their attempts to 
promote their ideas during the negotiations and deliberations of the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety. It focuses particularly on the deliberate efforts by domestic and international actors to 
frame and reframe the discourse on precaution, by influencing consumer’s perception of risks and 
biotechnology.  
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
Under international law, there are only two key complementary international agreements 
that were specifically designed to regulate the international import, export, handling, and use of 
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any LMOs that may have adverse consequences on biological diversity, taking into consideration 
risks to human health. The two international agreements are the 1992 CBD and the 2000 Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety, both of which give prominence to the precautionary principle vis-à-vis 
biotechnology. Further, the Cartagena Protocol represents the most significant case of domestic 
and international actors’ attempts to influence Canadian policy by seeking to incorporate the 
precautionary principle into an international agreement with the specific intent of establishing the 
principle as part of the corpus of international environment law. While it may appear that the 
Cartagena Protocol is an example of the international rules pathway, Canada has yet to ratify the 
protocol so its relevance for Canada lies in the evolution and clarification of the different ways of 
thinking about precaution that emerged during the negotiations and the connection between ideas 
and interests that they revealed. The disputes around the protocol and their discursive effects show 
how an international norm can have consequences for domestic policy even if it fails to be 
embodied in an international rule in a way that is binding for the state concerned. Thus, this section 
reflects the interplay of ideas, institutions, and interests during the negotiation process of the 
Cartagena Protocol. Specifically, it brings to light the fact that the discourse, concerning the 
proposed adoption of the precautionary principle hinged on economic and trade interests. This 
thesis contends that economic and trade interests were the primary and prevailing motive as to why 
the actors involved in the negotiation process argued and negotiated in the manner in which they 
did. Additionally, while the opposing States would fall under specific labels e.g. “Miami Group” 
or “Like Minded Group”, the truth of the matter is that the dispute was essentially between 
countries that exported and imported genetically modified products, each possessing unique 
regulatory frameworks. Each country appealed to the discourse that most effectively secured its 
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interests at the negotiations, underlining the possibility of different formulations of the principle 
or the sidelining of the principle altogether, 
Changing the discourse and reassessing the norm  
The Cartagena Protocol was negotiated from 1996–2000, under the auspices of the CBD, 
and implemented in 2003. Canada, while party to the CBD, has yet to ratify the Cartagena Protocol, 
but continues to host CBD meetings on relevant issues covered under the protocol (Falkner and 
Gupta 2006; UNEP 2010).  The Cartagena Protocol was commissioned under Article 19.3 of the 
CBD, which encourages parties of the convention to consider the need for an international 
agreement, specifically one that would provide the legal regulatory framework on the first 
transboundary transfer of LMOs (Depledge 2000; Falkner and Gupta 2006). The framework 
requires LMO-exporting States to consult and solicit advance informed agreements (AIA), based 
on a comprehensive risk assessment. This obligation was negotiated for and adopted by the 
protocol, based on the request of developing countries, which feared the introduction of LMOs 
within their States without their knowledge and without any prior risk assessment (Falkner and 
Gupta 2006). These countries insisted that the protocol makes “biosafety information-sharing 
mandatory on GMO exporting countries and would legitimize an importing country’s right to 
restrict GMO trade in the face of scientific uncertainty about risk or potential adverse 
socioeconomic impacts” (Falkner and Gupta 2006, 23). 
On its face, the Cartagena Protocol adopts a regulatory framework which is premised on 
the precautionary principle, as first proposed by the African Group (CBD 1997). This group argued 
that “biotech products could result in social and economic dislocations in the global south, and that 
a Biosafety Protocol should help mitigate these disruptions” (Andrée 2005, 30). The position 
endorsed by the African group was adopted by the G-77 nations and China, a negotiating block 
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referred to as the “Like Minded Group” (Andrée 2005; CBD 1997; Falkner and Gupta 2006). The 
“Like Minded Group” argued that the precautionary principle was an essential concept in the 
decision making process vis-à-vis biosafety risk assessment (Andrée 2005). 
The member nations of the EU were initially divided during the negotiations. At the outset, 
countries such as Germany, France and Britain favored the position of Canada and other EU LMO-
exporting states, while Denmark and Austria were supportive of the African Group. Eventually a 
consensus position was reached and the EU delegation supported a strong formulation of the 
precautionary principle, arguing during the final stages of negotiations that the precautionary 
principle should act as a “legitimate basis for taking restrictive decisions on LMO imports without 
any of the caveats presented in earlier formations, including “cost-effectiveness” (Rio Declaration) 
and the “reasonable period of time” required for the provision of additional scientific evidence 
under the SPS” (Andrée 2005, 33). 
The US, “an imminent exporter of LMOs and a proponent of the idea that biotechnologies 
represented a boon for sustainable development with no documented risks to the environment, 
fought against all efforts to develop a new international instrument in the field of biosafety” 
(Andrée 2005, 30). This position and “framing” of the precautionary principle, as a viable and 
sustainable solution to food security, was supported by other LMO exporting countries. These 
countries organized as the “Miami Group” (Andrée 2005; Depledge 2000), which included 
Canada, Australia, Chile, Uruguay and Argentina. The “Miami Group” rejected the notion of a 
regulatory framework premised on the precautionary principle, instead proposing a framework 
premised on scientific assessment of risks or one that reflected their national interests, and would 
not cause an adverse effect on international trade (Levidow et al. 1996).  
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The “Miami Group” rejected the precautionary principle; instead, they argued for a weaker 
precautionary approach. Andrée (2005) argues that the rationale for the Miami Group’s proposition 
was grounded on the group’s unwillingness to lend credibility to the principle, fearing that 
recognition of it would lead to its crystallization in international law. This resulted in no further 
mention of the precautionary principle in the operational portions of the Cartagena Protocol 
(Andrée 2005; Chasek et al. 1999). 
During the late stages of the negotiation process, a group of States, referring to themselves 
as the “Compromise Group,” proposed a formulation of the precautionary principle consistent with 
the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) 
(Akasaka 2002; Andrée 2005). This proposal, emerging from the “Compromise Group,” was 
proposed by Japan and supported by Korea, Mexico, Norway and Switzerland. Singapore and New 
Zealand joined in the later stages. Andrée (2005) argues that the recommendation “met key Miami 
Group concerns in a way that Miami Group members had not been able to achieve amongst 
themselves” (p. 32).  
 The Compromise Group’s proposed formulation of the precautionary principle was hinged 
on Article 5.7 of the SPS agreement, which outlines criteria for the formation of provisional 
regulatory procedures in cases where scientific uncertainty is present.  Article 5.7 of the WTO SPS 
Agreement argues for precautionary measures “in cases where relevant scientific evidence is 
insufficient,” provided that states “seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more 
objective assessment of risk and review the measure accordingly, within a reasonable period of 
time”. Green & Epps (2007) and Mercurio & Shao (2010) suggest that Article 5.7 acts as “a shield” 
preventing countries from being obliged to adopt a particular version of the principle as a result of  
WTO policy making. 
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 Andrée (2005) notes that while some argue that the EU “won the debate,” the final text of 
the Protocol reflected a compromise by the EU. To begin with, “the operational articles of the 
Protocol would not actually mention the word “precaution” let alone “principle” (p. 37). 
Additionally, the final text of the protocol “reflected the Miami Group’s view that precaution is 
not an international legal principle, per se … [and] the EU had accepted that the invocation of 
precaution must occur within the risk analysis framework” (p. 37). Specifically, the final text of 
the Cartagena Protocol (2000), article 10.6, states that “Lack of scientific certainty due to 
insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential 
adverse effects of a living modified organism on the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity … shall not prevent [a] party from taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to 
the import of living modified organism” (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
2000).  
Stoett and Gore (2008) suggest that while the text allows states to reject the import of GM 
products on the grounds of possible human and environmental harm, the statement is restricted by 
the preamble. In effect, the protocol contains three deliberately conflicting provisions: “that trade 
and environment agreements should be mutually supportive with a view to achieving sustainable 
development,” that the agreement “shall not be interpreted as implying a change in the rights and 
obligations of a Party under any existing international agreements” and that the agreement “is not 
intended to subordinate this Protocol to other international agreements” (Secretariat of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity 2000). While the protocol thus leaves a great deal of room for 
signatories to adjust the relative priority of these three provisions to resolve conflicts in particular 
cases, another feature of the negotiations has also been observed. In arguing their positions during 
the negotiations, actors began to develop alternative frames, not just for understanding the specific 
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challenges of regulating trade in GMOs, but for understanding the key terms in the precautionary 
principle, such as “risk”, “harm”, “damage” and “benefit” as applied to biotechnologies in ways 
that support or attack key interests in the dispute.  This idea of problem framing as a “discursive 
weapon” and the special role of framing as an effect of the discourse around an international norm 
is discussed in the next section. 
The Frankenfood and the Killing Fields Framing 
Ryan (forthcoming), reflects  the work of Maeseele (2008), who suggests that NGOs and 
ENGOs “eagerly employed the discursive weapon and have communicated many alternative 
frames for people to interpret this technology” (160). Candland et al. (2008) make a similar 
observation and concludes that “framing necessarily involves condensation symbols and 
simplification, especially of issues involving scientific complexity” (140), and that “effective 
framing through necessary for dramaturgical purposes of activism, frequently use metaphors or 
scenarios that create or raise anxiety,” as is the case with “Frankenfood” (p. 140).  
The term “Frankenfood” was first used by Paul Lewis of Boston College in direct response 
to the decision of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to allow companies to 
market genetically modified food in the United States. Specifically, Paul Lewis, in a letter to the 
New York Times declared that “if they want to sell us Frankenfood, perhaps it's time to gather the 
villagers, light some torches and head to the castle”  (The New York Times 2000). The term is 
employed in a variety of formulations:  Frankenfruit, Frankenair, Frankenwater, and 
Frankenfarmers, and has had a tremendous impact on the public perception of GM products.  Ryan 
(forthcoming) suggests Frankenfood “provides the basis for provocative and emotive story-
making.”  
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Ever since the term “Frankenfood” was coined in 1992, “the term has been a pervasive 
(and quite effective) slogan of the anti-GM movement to vilify GM crops and biotechnology” 
Ryan (Forthcoming). This description has altered the discourse on biotechnology significantly and, 
more importantly, has been successful in shaping the consumer’s perception of biotechnology.  
In the REDES-Friends of the Earth (Uruguay) and Food and Water Watch video 
documentary “Killing Fields: The True Cost of Cheap Meat”, emotive storytelling includes images 
of burning fields, police beating protestors, bloodied faces of young indigenous protestors, and 
ravaged forest areas. These images link GM crops with poverty, land rights of indigenous 
populations, and forest degradation- all powerful framings that changes the discourse on GM 
products and engenders widespread, worldwide support (REDES-Friends of the Earth (Uraguay) 
and Food and Water Watch 2013). 
Bernstein and Cashore (2012) acknowledge that these framings tend to have “resonance 
with domestic ideology, culture and broader policy goals”. As a consequence, strategic framing 
can potentially translate into the successful linking of issues, like the commercialization of GM 
products, with established international norms, such as Sustainable Forest Management (SFM), 
Human Rights, and poverty alleviation. 
Within the Canadian context, this attempt to change the discourse is perpetuated  by wide 
spread media coverage, allowing anti-GM actors and organizations to not only succeed in 
promoting particular framings of GM products, but also to influence public confidence in the 
regulatory framework. The authors suggest that “strategies for change based on International 
Norms and Discourse depend on the moral vulnerability of the target state or firm” (p. 592). In 
other words, influencing the target is contingent on how susceptible and sensitive it is to 
challenges.  
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Adjusting perceptions: Pro-GM Discourse 
In response to a perception that the anti-GM framing was gaining ground unopposed, 
several companies in biotechnology industries launched a major initiative in 2000 aimed at 
communicating “science-based information about the benefits and safety of agricultural 
biotechnology and its contributions to sustainable development” (Council for Biotechnology 
Information 2013). This collaboration was funded by the BASF, Bayer CropScience, Dow, 
DuPont, Monsanto, and Syngenta (along with two trade associations - the Biotechnology Industry 
Organization and CropLife America), and resulted in the creation of an organization called the 
Council for Biotechnology Information (CBI). Ryan notes that the “the mission of the Council for 
Biotechnology Information (CBI) is to improve understanding and acceptance of biotechnology 
by collecting balanced, science-based information and communicating it through a variety of 
channels.”. Further, Ryan notes that the CBI utilizes videos, Twitter, Facebook, blogs and Internet 
website to accomplish its mandate.  
Additionally, BIOTECanada, a national industry association with nearly 250 members, is 
also intended to “lead an ongoing dialogue to create science-based policy and increase awareness 
of biotechnology” (BIOTECanada 2011). This group is a reflection of the “diverse nature of 
Canada’s health, industrial and agricultural biotechnology sectors,” and actively seeks to support 
the interest of the biotech industry by informing Canadian decision-makers of the bio-economy 
(BIOTECanada 2011).  
CBI and BIOTECanada’s strategies appear to be in direct response to the framings 
employed by opponents of biotechnology. In so doing, they buttress the science-based approach 
to regulation and standard setting, concurrently rejecting the strong version of the precautionary 
principle and its role in the regulatory systems. 
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International Rules Pathway 
Introduction  
 McMahon & Young (2007) suggest that while international norms are contested, they are 
also resolvable through treaty interpretation and rules of international law. Bernstein and Cashore 
(2012) propose that the international rules pathway allows for the analysis and identifications of 
“conditions under which rules will produce policy and behavioral change, while also highlighting 
that the logic of rules may differ from other logics at play in complex governance arrangements” 
(p. 590). To be effective, this pathway requires states to accept that they should adopt 
environmental regulations where substantial scientific evidence of risk exists, and that, in those 
cases, preventative action must be taken. Sands (2003) suggests that the ability of international 
lawyers to construct cases for international regulations “will often turn upon the ability to show 
that the lack of action by the international community is likely to result in significant adverse 
effects” (Sands 2003, 6). International law notwithstanding, the previous section suggests that 
whether states will actually respond to claims that innovation may result in significant adverse 
effects depends on a complex interplay of ideas, interests and institutions. 
As noted by McMahon & Young (2007), UNCED represented a commitment on the part 
of states to “prioritize environmental issues and consolidate a vast and unwieldy patchwork of 
international legal commitments” (p. 4).  
The UNCED recognized the presence of several “products and by-products of human 
technological and industrial innovation which are considered to be particularly harmful to the 
environment, and which therefore require international regulation” (Sands 2003, 5). Falkner 
(2000) notes that international biosafety standards were “raised at the diplomatic level in the 
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1980s” (p. 302), and have since garnered significant traction. Biotechnology and agricultural 
practices were identified as product and/or activity which required the attention of the UNCED 
(Falkner 2000; Sands 2003). 
Presently, there are several international environmental agreements and conventions 
relating to biotechnology, some of which are legally binding and others which amount to 
international norms. These treaties (also called  accords, conventions, agreements and protocols) 
(Sands 2003)  include: inter alia, the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the 2000 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the 2003 United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, the 1985 Vienna 
Convention (including its 1987 Montreal Protocol), the 2005 UNESCO Universal Declaration on 
Bioethics and Human Rights, the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement, 1994), the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT Agreement, 1994), and the 1997 International Plant Protection Convention. All of 
these agreements and conventions reveal the need for  established international obligations in the 
face of scientific uncertainty (Cameron and Abouchar 1996; O’Riordan and Jordan 1995; Sands 
2003).   
However, in spite of several international attempts at creating a legally binding regulatory 
framework for biotechnology, such as the OECD Safety Considerations for Biotechnology, United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO), the International Plant Protection Convention, and the Codex Alimentarius Commission 
(Falkner 2000), research conducted by the CBD Secretariat concluded that:  
While there is a plethora of guidelines, regional and international instruments that either 
directly (as in the case of the EC Directives) or obliquely address the subject of 
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transboundary movement of LMOs, none of these instruments may substitute for a 
Biosafety Protocol … further, the vast majority of existing instruments are merely 
guidelines and accordingly not legally binding. (CBD Secretariat 1997, 8) 
 
The international rules pathway suggests that once the precautionary principle has been 
enshrined in international treaty agreements, it will eventually be reflected in the domestic policy 
of the signatories. However, as already noted, there are few international agreements where any 
formulations of the precautionary principle appear, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety being the 
only international agreement governing biotechnology where the principle is found. Specifically, 
the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety states that “Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient 
relevant scientific information . . . shall not prevent the Party of import, in order to avoid or 
minimize such potential adverse effects, from taking a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the 
import of the living modified organism in question”. Nevertheless, there are other international 
and multinational trade-related instruments that refer to the principle and which could be the 
starting point for movement down the international rules pathway, notably the Codex Alimentarius 
and, in the Canadian case, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and these will now be 
considered in turn. 
The Codex Alimentarius Commission and the Precautionary Principle 
The Codex Alimentarius, as a joint food standards program by the WHO and the FAO, was 
implemented in 1963, and it was originally a voluntary agreement. The Codex aims to “protecting 
the health of consumers and ensuring fair practices in the food trade” (Joint FAO/WHO Codex 
Alimentarius Commission and Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme 2001, 1B:IV)and is 
recognized by the SPS Agreement as the international agency organization responsible for 
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establishing standard associated to food safety and the harmonization of food safety measures 
affecting international trade. The Codex requires members to establish their food safety measures 
based on the standards, guidelines, or recommendations of the Commission.  
In an attempt to enshrine the precautionary principle into the agreement, the French 
negotiator suggested that “the precautionary principle should be regarded as an appropriate tool of 
risk management provided that it was not used as an excuse to establish unwarranted and arbitrary 
trade barriers” (Codex Alimentarius Commission 2000, para. 3). Further, the representative of 
France suggested that “legitimate factors other than strictly scientific data could not be ignored by 
governments and that the development of world trade could not take place without having regard 
to the legitimate rights of consumers” (Codex Alimentarius Commission 2000, para. 3).  
Inclusion of the precautionary principle in this form was strongly rejected by several 
members, suggesting that the precautionary principle “was not generally recognized or defined in 
relation to food safety” (Codex Alimentarius Commission 2000, para. 47). Recalling the provisions 
of SPS Article 5.7, the representative of WTO noted that “guidelines on the application of 
precaution could facilitate common understanding of risk analysis, but should not contradict the 
rights and obligations of member countries under the SPS Agreement” (Codex Alimentarius 
Commission 2000, para. 56). This prompted discussion during the Commission’s meeting in 
Geneva in July 2001. During this meeting, “several delegations expressed the view that the 
"precautionary principle" was not a principle of international law and should not be mentioned as 
such in the framework of Codex” (FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission 2001).  
The Codex Alimentarius is therefore unclear about its view of the precautionary principle. 
The Codex Alimentarius adopts a weak version both with respect to the trigger and the remedy. 
Specifically, it argues that “when there is evidence that a risk to human health exists but scientific 
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data are insufficient or incomplete, the Commission should not proceed to elaborate a standard but 
should consider elaborating a related text, such as a code of practice, provided that such a text 
would be supported by the available scientific evidence” (FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius 
Commission 2001). 
NAFTA and the Precautionary Principle 
Canada is signatory to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a regional 
free trade agreement which also includes the US and Mexico. This agreement, which came into 
effect in 1994, has the objective of eliminating tariffs and duties on trade between the signatories 
of the treaty. The governance arrangements that oversee the agreement include the NAFTA 
Secretariat (pursuant to NAFTA, Article 2002) and a trilateral Free Trade Commission. The 
Canadian Federal Agency, Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada, notes that “Since 
1994, trade has blossomed, investment has increased, and all three countries have become more 
competitive. From 1993 to 2009, trade among the NAFTA countries has more than doubled, from 
$288 billion to $701 billion” (Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada 2011). 
On its face, the text NAFTA agreement seems to allude to the precautionary principle as 
evidenced in the wording of Articles 907.3 of the SRM text, and 715.4 of the SPS text; however, 
a closer examination would reveal a weak precautionary approach, instead of a precautionary 
principle. This argument is further substantiated by the text of the Risk Assessment section, which 
states that SPS measures must be: “based on scientific principles, taking into account other factors 
including geographic conditions; not maintained where there is no longer a scientific basis; and 
based on a risk assessment appropriate to the  circumstances” (NAFTA Article 712.3). In addition, 
NAFTA, Article 907.3 states that 
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“In the absence of scientific information sufficient to complete a risk assessment, Parties 
may adopt provisional regulations on the basis of available information. Once sufficient 
information becomes available, the Party shall complete its assessment within a reasonable 
period and where appropriate revise its regulation” (Foreign Affairs, Trade and 
Development Canada 2011). 
 
 It appears that any attempt to challenge the present domestic regime would invariably 
necessitate a challenge along this pathway, in combination with additional pathways. The 
pathways framework suggests that when a pathway, such as the international rules pathway, is 
activated, it also becomes accessible, but only to state actors. Non-state are however able to attempt 
to pressure governments by pointing to international agreements to which the state is a signatory, 
and as such, bound to the text of the agreement.  
 The failure to include a strong version of the precautionary principle in key international 
environmental and trade agreements ensures that the version of the precautionary principle adopted 
in Canada would be strongly influenced by the international rules pathway. It produces losers as 
well as winners. The losers invariably seek creative means of reintroducing their agenda. As will 
be shown, this creativity is usually expressed in attempts to combine different pathways. Efforts 
to use the international rules pathway itself to revisit Canada’s approach to precaution have been 
largely unsuccessful as the following examples demonstrate.  
The Emergence of the Precautionary Principle in Canadian Domestic Legislation 
 Tollefson and Thornback (2007), citing the work of Preston (2005), suggest that there are 
two divergent legal avenues by which the precautionary principle may enter domestic law at the 
other end of the international rules pathway: “through the application of international law or 
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through its application as a principle of domestic law” (p. 40) .  These two categories can be further 
subdivided into direct application, where it creates a binding obligation on its own merit, or by 
indirect application, where it is applied as an interpretative aid. Additionally, domestic law can 
also be derived from common law or statutory sources such as Pest Control Products Act (PCPA), 
Species at Risk Act (SARA) or CEPA. This thesis examines the role of indirect application, 
domestic law and statutory sources.   
Indirect Application 
 Tollefson and Thornback (2007) suggest that domestic courts are generally not keen on 
employing the precautionary principle as an interpretative aid, especially when it is “inconsistent 
with applicable domestic law” (p. 41). Further, Tollefson and Thornback (2007) note that in cases 
where the precautionary principle is vague, this vagueness opens the door for domestic courts to 
give it “some specific work to do” (Stein 2000, 2).  
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Spraytech8 case represents the most 
significant recognition of the precautionary principle by the Canadian judiciary, and illustrates an 
indirect application of the principle.  
The case involved the small town of Hudson, Quebec that enacted By-law 270, which 
limited the application of pesticides within its boundary to specified locations and for enumerated 
activities. This represented one of the first municipal bans on the use of cosmetic pesticides in 
Canada after years of lobbying. This By-law was subsequently challenged by a lawn care 
company, which requested that the Supreme Court of Canada declare the by-law to be inoperative 
and ultra vires the Town’s authority. 
                                                 
 
8 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241, 2001 SCC 40 
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The court upheld the bylaw and addressed the legal status of the precautionary principle. 
The court reasoned that despite the vexing conceptual uncertainties confronting the precautionary 
principle (Sunstein 2005; Sands 2003; Cameron, Jordan, and O’Riordan 2001), that a good 
argument could be made that the precautionary principle had gained the status of customary 
international law. The dictum of Justice L’Heureux-Dube J. relied upon the principle as an 
emerging norm of international law to support a domestic interpretive undertaking, essentially 
reasoning that principles of law can constrain the actions of a sovereign state (Tollefson and 
Thornback 2007).  The court reasoned that municipal law could regulate harm in a manner 
consistent with international law and policy, but also that the precautionary principle “is a 
mandatory rule of statutory construction that must be considered by the courts or in administrative 
decision making” (Kazaz 2013, 9). 
Significantly in the Spraytech case, the Supreme Court of Canada defined the precautionary 
principle according to para. 7 of the Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development 
(1990): 
“In order to achieve sustainable development, policies must be based on the precautionary 
principle. Environmental measures must anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of 
environmental degradation. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack 
of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent 
environmental degradation" (UNECE 1990). 
Following the Spraytech case, there has been several attempts at giving the precautionary 
principle a mandatory rule of statutory interpretations (Kazaz 2013, 23). The Wier case is one such 
example. Josette Wier, appealed a decision to issue a permit to control the Spruce Bark and 
Mountain Pine beetles in British Columbia’s Morice Forest District and Tweedsmuir Provincial 
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Park using Monosodium Methane Arsenate (“MSMA”), sold under the trade name Glowon. Wier 
requested the court to rule in her favor based on the precautionary principle and the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in the Spraytech case.  The court upheld the analysis of the Spraytech 
case and “applied [the] principle to the extent that it should help inform the contextual approach 
to judicial review and statutory interpretation” (Kazaz 2013, 10).  
In the cases of Western Canada Wilderness Committee v. British Columbia (Minister of 
Forests)9 and  R. v. Kingston (Corporation of the City)10, the court refused to attach significance 
to the precautionary principle outside of its dictum in the Spraytech case, and further refused to 
interpret domestic legislations pertaining to risk outside of the Government of Canada’s prescribed 
frameworks.  
Additionally, in the Sage Grouse11 and Nooksack Dace12 cases, the courts observed that 
the precautionary principle could aid in statutory interpretation of section 41 of SARA. It also 
noted that while “s. 38 of SARA is a codification of the precautionary principle which, as stated 
in the Preamble, in part, meets Canada’s commitments” under international law, both cases 
reinforce the particular formulation and status of the precaution principle, as adopted by the 
Government of Canada.  
Both the Supreme Court of Canada and provincial courts have been consistent in their 
interpretation of the precautionary principle. A possible explanation for this consistency is 
explored by Benvenisti (1993), who suggests that “national courts tend to interpret international 
                                                 
 
9 Western Canada Wilderness Committee v. British Columbia (Minister of Environment and Parks), [1988] B.C.J. 
No. 436 (S.C.) 
10 R. v. Kingston (Corporation of the City),[2004], 187 O.C.A. 143. 
11 Alberta Wilderness Association v. Canada (Environment), 2009 FC 710, 45 C.E.L.R. (3d) 48 
12 Nooksack Dace: Environmental Defence Canada v. Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2009 FC 878, 45 C.E.L.R. 
(3d) 161. 
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rules so as not to upset their governments' interests, sometimes actually seeking guidance from the 
executive for interpreting treaties” (p. 161). In essence, this would suggest that the judicial arm of 
government, with respect to the Government of Canada’s position on the precautionary principle, 
works in tandem with government, and in so doing, is “careful not to impinge with their decisions 
on their governments' international policies and interests” (Benvenisti 1993, 161). 
International Judicial Decisions and the Precautionary Principle 
 Jennings and Watts (1997) define international law as “the body of rules which are legally 
binding on states in their intercourse with each other” (p. 4). Under international law, these rules 
derive their authority in conformity with Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ). The ICJ identifies five sources of international law: (a) Treaties between States; (b) 
Customary international law derived from the practice of States; (c) General principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations; and, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
international law: (d) Judicial decisions and the writings of “the most highly qualified publicists”. 
This list is no longer considered to be exhaustive.  
Sands et al. (2012) suggest that under international environmental law, the list outlined in 
Article 38 of the ICJ “does not wholly reflect the sources of obligation, broadly understood, which 
have arisen in international environmental law” (p. 94). The list proposed by the International Law 
Commission (ILC) in 1989, suggests that  decisions of international organizations, and judgments 
of international courts or tribunals” as well as those identified in Article 38 (1) is a more established 
source of international environmental law. This section examines the jurisprudence of international 
courts and tribunals. It also addresses State parties appearing before them, in order shed some light 
on the meaning and effect of the precautionary principle, specifically, the 1997 Gabcikovo 
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Nagymaros13 Project case, the 1974 Nuclear Tests Case14, Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases15,the 
MOX case16,and the EC - Beef Growth Hormones case. 
The Case Concerning the Gabcikovo Nagymaros Project 
The case concerning the Gabcikovo Nagymaros Project was the first contentious case 
before the ICJ. More specifically, this case concerned a 1977 Treaty between Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia and involved the construction of a ‘System of Locks’ on the Danube River 
Additionally,  this was to be managed by both parties and intended for the production of 
hydroelectricity, flood protection, and improved navigation. Opposition to the project arose, as 
domestic environmental groups argued that the project threatened the ecological diversity of 
Hungary. 
Facing growing opposition to the project, the government of Hungary suspended its work 
on the project in 1989, eventually terminating the Treaty in 1992. The Government of Hungary 
argued that “the ecological risks of the Project, including reduction in water flows, damage to 
water quality, and the consequential loss of ‘fluvial fauna and flora’, were unacceptable”. Further, 
Hungary argued that new norms of international environmental law precluded Treaty performance.  
The precautionary principle was one of a number of emerging environmental norms cited 
by the government of Hungary in its effort to evidence the lawfulness of its Treaty termination. 
Further, Hungary relied on the Bergen Declaration’s formulation of the precautionary principle, 
arguing that international law necessitates : [...] tak[ing] precautionary measures to anticipate, 
                                                 
 
13 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep. 7. 
14 Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), International Court of Justice (ICJ), 20 December 1974. 
15 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), ITLOS Cases No 3/4, 117 I.L.R. 148 
(Aug. 27, 1999) 
16 MOX Plant case (Ireland v. United Kingdom) (Request for Provisional Measures) (ITLOS) [126 ILR 259] 643, 
1015 n24 
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prevent or minimize damage to their transboundary resources and mitigate adverse effects. Where 
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be 
used as a reason for postponing such measures (UNECE 1990). 
The court rejected this argument, with the majority not mentioning the principle in its 
dictum, and failed to address the status or possible application of the principle. Howley (2009) 
observed that “the very failure of the majority to adequately articulate the status of the 
precautionary principle has, in an instance of judicial deference to perceived institutional 
hierarchies, caused uncertainty and obstructed the development of the principle at the international 
level” (p. 12), concluding that the reluctance of the majority in Gabcikovo “has had had a negative 
impact on the willingness of other international tribunals and bodies to use and develop the 
precautionary principle, and by extension, international environmental law generally” (Howley 
2009, 12).  
The Nuclear Tests Dispute (Australia, New Zealand et al. v. France) 
The ICJ case, regarding nuclear testing, involved France and, in opposition, a number of 
South Pacific States, principally New Zealand and Australia. The disagreement is evidenced by a 
succession of judgments by the ICJ, the first in 1973-1974, and the second in 1995. This thesis is 
primarily concerned with the second phase of the case, whereby French President Jacques Chirac 
declared urbi et orbi that France would be conducting a series of underground nuclear explosions, 
beginning in September 1995. As a result, the immediate reaction was one of outrage, with several 
individuals and NGOs moving to the European Commission of Human Rights, the Human Rights 
Committee, and the Court of Justice of the European Communities for redress (Romano 2000). As 
well, the leaders of the South Pacific Forum States voiced their “extreme outrage” at the proposed 
resumption of nuclear testing and demanded that France desist from any further testing in the 
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region (Richardson 1995). In August 1995, the New Zealand Government returned to the ICJ to 
request a decision based on the French government’s decision to resume nuclear testing.  
The Government of New Zealand relied extensively on the precautionary principle, 
contending that it was “a very widely accepted and operative principle of international law” and 
as such, “shifted the burden onto France to prove that the proposed tests would not give rise to 
environmental damage”. France responded that the status of the precautionary principle, 
concerning international law, was still contentious and that State practice indicated that it had not 
yet amounted to customary international law. Interestingly, the ICJ followed the precedents 
established in the Gabcikovo case, and did not address the status of the principle, although Judge 
Weeramantry’s dissent noted that the principle was “gaining increasing support as part of the 
international law of the environment”.  
The Southern Bluefin Tuna cases 
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) has been more willing to 
examine the status of the precautionary principle. In the 1999 Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, 
Australia and New Zealand presented arguments before the tribunals invoking the precautionary 
principle. Specifically, Australia and New Zealand requested “the parties act consistently with the 
precautionary principle in fishing for Southern Bluefin Tuna pending a final settlement of the 
dispute.”  Japan, the respondent State decided not to address the status or effect of the principle in 
its response, lest this be viewed as an acknowledgment of the principle. In its decision, the tribunal 
requested that the parties should “act with prudence and caution to ensure that effective 
conservation measures are taken to prevent serious harm to the stock of southern bluefin tuna” 
(para. 77). It further noted that, although the Tribunal cannot conclusively assess the scientific 
evidence presented by the parties, it finds that measures should be taken as a matter of urgency to 
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preserve the rights of the parties and to avert further deterioration of the southern bluefin tuna stock 
(para. 80). Sands (2003) suggests that “in ordering the parties to refrain from conducting 
experimental fishing programmes, the Tribunal was plainly taking a precautionary approach, as 
Judge Treves recognised in his Separate Opinion” (p. 276). However, both the tribunal and the 
Separate Opinion of Judge Treves did not rule on or expand on the status of the precautionary 
principle.   
The MOX Plant Case 
The MOX Plant case stems from the United Kingdom’s governmental authorization to 
commission a new MOX facility in Sellafield. The facility was designed to reprocess spent nuclear 
fuel into a new fuel known as mixed oxide fuel or MOX. In response, the Irish government argued 
that the plan threatened the Irish Sea by exposing it to pollution and possible risks of radioactive 
spills during transport of hazardous materials to and from the plant. In this way, the United 
Kingdom government had failed to apply a precautionary approach to the protection of the Irish 
Sea and in so doing placed the Sea at risk. Further, Ireland invoked the principle to buttress its 
claim that the burden of proof was with UK, requiring UK to demonstrate that no harm would arise 
from discharges and other consequences of the operation of the MOX plant.  
 Sands (2003) states that the Tribunal did not order the suspension of the plant’s operation 
but rather  “ordered the parties to co-operate and enter into consultations to exchange further 
information on possible consequences for the Irish Sea arising out of the commissioning of the 
MOX plant” (225). The Order of the Tribunal contains a precautionary character (Sands 2003) but 
falls short of providing the precautionary principle with status and content.  
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EC - Beef Growth Hormones Case 
On January 26, 1996, the United States called for discussions with the EC, alleging that 
measures taken by the EC, under the Council Directive, prohibit the use of certain substances, 
which have a hormonal action, in livestock farming. This restricted or prohibited imports of meat 
and meat products from the United States, and is thereby inconsistent with Articles 2, 3 and 5 of 
the SPS Agreement, Articles III or XI of the GATT 1994, Article 2 of the TBT and Article 4 of 
the Agreement on Agriculture. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Norway were third parties to 
the dispute. In the submission [the respondent], EC argued that the precautionary principle is, or 
has become “a general customary rule of international law” or at least “a general principle of law” 
(Bernasconi-Osterwalder 2005, 272). However, the government of the US does not embrace the 
arguments and advancements of the EU. Instead, in the case of EC Hormones 17, American officials 
argued that the precautionary principle does not amount to a general principle or norm of 
international law since the concept has several permutations. Rather, it is best classified as an 
“approach,” instead of a principle under international law (EC Biotech 2006).  
Canada, stating its position in the EC Hormones18 case [para. 91], employed a different 
tactic. On one hand, Canada acknowledged that the precautionary principle can be viewed as an 
emerging principle of law, which may crystallize into one of the “general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations,” within the meaning of Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). On the other hand, Canada argued that the precautionary 
                                                 
 
17 Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) –Complaint by the United States, 
WT/DS26/R/USA, adopted 13 February 1998, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS26/AB/R, 
WT/DS48/AB/R, DSR 1998:III, 699 
18 Panel Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) –Complaint by the United States, 
WT/DS26/R/USA, adopted 13 February 1998, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, WT/DS26/AB/R, 
WT/DS48/AB/R, DSR 1998:III, 699 
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principle has not been absorbed into the corpus of public international law [Canada’s appellee’s 
submission in case EC hormones, para. 34].  
The ruling in the EC Hormones case reaffirms the notion that international trade 
agreements, and their governing instruments, prefer to adopt a science-based regime for 
“disciplining health regulations which may affect international trade in agricultural products and 
foodstuffs” (Majone 2002, 91) and attempts to “promote the principle to the status of a “central 
plank” … [and] more ambitiously to the status of a general principle of international economic and 
environmental law” (Majone 2002, 91).  
The international norms and discourse pathway illustrated the extent to which a variety of 
actors could use that pathway to elaborate on the meaning and significance of the precautionary 
principle. They struggled to frame the debate in ways that would eventually reappear in domestic 
politics.  State and non-state actors alike took part in this struggle over meaning. The international 
rules pathway, by contrast, is largely confined to governments and their legal representatives. As 
the cases just analyzed suggest, governments have been extremely cautious in appealing to the 
precautionary principle, even where it might provide them with some temporary advantage in a 
particular case.  The sole area where the principle might have gained some purchase remains 
international trade law and here the use of the principle runs into the clash of interests between 
food importing countries, who have reason to adopt a strong version as a form of protection for 
their own farmers, and food exporting countries, who favour weak versions or no version at all to 
keep markets open. As a major exporter of food and food products, it is no surprise to see the 
Canadian government using this pathway to block adoption of anything but a weak version of the 
principle.  Are other pathways open and how did the precautionary principle fare on them? 
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Markets pathway 
Introduction 
Bernstein and Cashore (2012) suggest that “the markets pathway encompasses processes 
or tactics that attempt to manipulate, work with or leverage markets to create domestic policy 
change” (p. 593). Use of this pathway is premised on the notion that it is in the interest of firms 
and the governments that support them to maintain their access to international markets and ensure 
greater leverage in pricing their products. Thus, within the context of this thesis, both domestic 
and international actors travel this pathway in order to secure policy change, targeting both 
government and industry in the process. 
Opponents of GM technology found it difficult to mobilize support against the first 
generation of GM maize, canola, and soy released in Canada. This is primarily because farmers 
openly support herbicide-tolerant and Bt crops because of the time and cost-saving nature of the 
technology. This endorsement made it much more difficult for opponents to utilize the tactics 
employed in Europe, where the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak allowed for 
risk factors to be exaggerated (Levidow et al. 1996).Nevertheless, groups including the Council of 
Canadians (a multi-issue anti-globalization actor), the Sierra Club of Canada and Greenpeace 
Canada (both considered ENGOs with significant national memberships), The Canadian Health 
Coalition, The Saskatchewan Organic Directorate, among others, have actively resisted the 
biotechnology industry and the commercialization of biotechnology in Canada. Instead, they lobby 
for implementation of a strong formulation of the precautionary principle to govern the regulatory 
regime.  
This section of the thesis details the efforts by domestic and foreign actors, utilizing the 
markets pathway, to bring about policy change with respect to precaution. Specifically, this section 
 75 
 
addresses issues related to the commercialization and subsequent withdrawal of RR Wheat, GE 
Flax seed, and GM potatoes. 
 
Roundup Ready (RR) Wheat  
In May 2004, Monsanto publically verified that it was withdrawing its application for the 
commercialization of its genetically engineered Roundup Ready (RR) wheat (Monsanto 2004). 
According to Eaton (2011a), Monsanto’s announcement surprised many, especially because they 
had already begun the technical development stage of the RR wheat in 1997, and had conducted 
six years of field testing in-order to establish the economic potential of the technology and alleviate 
safety concerns. Monsanto had also  estimated that the new technology could potentially result in 
a 5–10% increase in yields (Monsanto 2004).  In all accounts, this announcement was surprising 
and contradictory announcement, especially because Monsanto had already advanced this 
technology through both the Canadian and US regulatory systems, spending at least $5 million in 
the 2004 fiscal year. 
Monsanto had envisioned a wide buy-in by Canadian farmers, as a result the economic 
potential of the crop; however,  in 2001, a coalition of farm, rural, consumer, NGOs, and ENGOs 
organized and engaged in a public campaign against the commercialization of RR wheat in Canada 
(Eaton 2011a). The coalition was comprised of a diverse group of actors (Table 5). Six of the nine  
organizations were farm/rural organizations (Eaton 2009), many of whom had significant 
economic interest in the commercialization of the RR wheat technology. It could be argued that 
Prairie producers, in particular, would have gained considerably from the GM wheat technology, 
especially considering the average wheat yield and production of these farmers. 
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As noted earlier, six of the nine organizations were hostile to the commercialization of RR 
wheat and originated from rural and farm communities.  
 
 
 
 
Table 5 - Organizations involved in the 2001 coalition to stop the introduction of RR Wheat 
Name of 
organization/date of 
founding 
Type of lobby  Main complaint(s)  
about RR wheat  
Proposed 
action 
National Farmers Union 
(NFU)/1969 
Left-wing farm 
organization formed to 
unite provincial 
Farmers Unions that 
led radical farm 
organizing since WWl 
Loss of control of the 
food/seed system to 
multinationals, threat to 
profitability and 
autonomy of family farm 
Moratorium 
on all GMOs. 
All GMOs 
must be 
subject to 
democratic 
control, 
collective 
ownership 
and not-for-
profit 
distribution 
Saskatchewan  
Association of Rural 
Municipalities  
(SARM)/1905 
Advocate of rural 
municipalities  to 
senior levels of 
government 
Loss of markets, secrecy 
of field trial 
locations 
Ban GM 
wheat until 
segregation 
and detection 
systems, 
tolerance 
levels, 
markets and 
changes to 
regulatory 
system are 
established 
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Saskatchewan  Organic 
Directorate 
(SOD)/1998 
Producer controlled  
umbrella org. for 
producers, processors, 
buyers, traders, 
certifiers and 
consumer 
Liability in cases of 
contamination and loss 
of ability to farm org 
Complete ban 
on all GMOs 
since 
contamination  
is inevitable 
Agricultural Producers 
Association of 
Saskatchewan  
(APAS)/1999 
Saskatchewan  general 
farm• organization 
with representation 
from all rural 
municipalities 
Market impact, 
agronomic issues--
effects on zero till 
All GM 
wheat must 
be approved 
based on 
merit 
(markets, 
agronomy) 
Keystone Agricultural 
Producers 
(KAP)/1984 
Manitoba general farm 
organization 
Market impact, 
agronomic issues, 
segregation 
Prevent 
registration 
until 
consumer 
acceptance 
Canadian Wheat Board 
(CWB)/1935 
Western Canadian 
single-desk marketing 
organization jointly 
governed by producers 
and the federal 
government 
Loss of markets (80+% 
of customers 
are concerned about GM 
wheat) 
Add 
cost/benefit 
analysis to 
regulations. 
Do not 
release RR 
wheat at this 
time 
Canadian Health 
Coalition (CHC)/1979 
NGO primarily 
concerned with public 
health care 
GMOs may have 
negative health impacts. 
Regulatory system is 
anti-democratic and 
serves 
life-science industry 
Regulatory 
system must 
be overhauled 
and serve the 
public 
Greenpeace 
Canada/1971 
International  
environmental NGO 
founded in Canada 
GMOs will harm the 
environment and may 
have negative health 
impacts. Life should not 
be patented 
Stop all 
GMOs, 
reform the 
regulatory 
system 
Council of Canadians 
(CoC)/1985 
Multi-issue nationalist 
NGO 
Consumers don't want 
GM wheat. Long-term 
impacts on health and 
the environment are 
unknown 
Stop all 
GMOs until 
labelling, 
long-term 
studies and 
regulatory 
reform 
Adapted from Eaton (2009) 
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In effect, Eaton (2011) notes that “two of the three general farm organisations on the 
prairies (that of Saskatchewan – the Agricultural Producers Association of Saskatchewan and that 
of Manitoba – the Keystone Agricultural Producers) participated in the coalition based on 
mandates from their memberships” (Eaton 2011b, 507). 
While all members of the coalition opposed the commercialization of RR wheat, Eaton 
(2011b) notes that there was discontent by several members, specifically rural/farm organizations. 
Feelings of discontent arose from the farmers and rural organizations’ unease of working with 
more radical groups. Eaton (2011b) notes that farm organizations and the Saskatchewan 
Association of Rural Municipalities did not oppose all GM products, but they were specifically 
against the commercialization of RR wheat. Consequently, the coalition decided that each “each 
group [should speak] from its particular area of expertise about the specific threats that RR wheat 
posed for its membership” (p. 507), allowing the coalition to propose several framings of the issue 
and proposing varying demands and recommendations. 
 
The logic of the markets pathway suggests that the resistance, which eventually led to 
Monstanto’s withdrawal of the GM technology, was orchestrated on two fronts: Firstly, as an 
ENGO, with access to significant resources and an established network of international supporters 
and allies, Greenpeace Canada was able to strategically argue market non-acceptance at the focal 
point of the controversy, allowing for a wide cross-section of consumers, both at the domestic and 
international level, to become aware of their campaign against GM wheat. Secondly, Eaton (2009) 
notes that the primary concern of farm/rural organizations was “access to markets, and more 
longstanding questions about how to keep profit and control on the farm)[which] became 
articulated with and through issues and discourses that are often characterized as consumer-driven” 
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(p. 270). The coalition remained convinced that the commercialization of RR wheat would threaten 
existing export wheat markets. Eaton (2009) notes that “the refusal of Europe and Japan to accept 
GM material in their food imports  
became the strongest argument … one that farmers advanced by reciting claims about the 
supremacy of the consumer” (p. 260). 
The efforts and influence of Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) was also critical to the success 
of the coalition efforts. Threats to export markets by the federal agency, the CWB, Western 
Canada’s single desk marketing agency for wheat and barley, establish the legitimacy of the claim, 
as they were able to “gather information from its buyers and early on in the debate” (Eaton 2009, 
267) to support their position. Further, the CWB commissioned studies by weed scientists which 
suggested that genetic make-up of the wheat’s RR trait would result in farmers abandoning reduced 
tillage practices, resulting in soil erosion (Van Acker, Brule-Babel, and Friesen 2003). To date, 
the CBAN successfully mobilized 233 farmer and consumer groups, from 26 countries, to support 
its call to stop the commercialization of GM Wheat, 47 of which are from Canada [See table 6]. 
Table 6 - Canadian groups who signed petition re: Rejection of Genetically Modified Wheat 
 
Avenue Bio de l'Est, St-Mathieu-de-Rioux, 
Canada 
Les Ensachages Bio-Org, Québec 
Beyond Factory Farming, Canada Les Jardins de la Mingaie, Québec 
Burin Peninsula Environmental Reform 
Committee, Canada 
Local Organic Fair Trade Co-operative 
(Cambridge, ON), Canada 
Canadian Biotechnology Action Network, 
Canada 
Make the Desert Blossom, Alberta, Canada 
Canadian Organic Growers, Canada National Farmers Union, Canada 
Centre interdisciplinaire de recherche sur la 
biologie, la santé, la société et 
l'environnement (CINBIOSE), Québec 
National Farmers Union, Local 1, Ontario, 
Canada 
Club Plein-Champs, Québec National Union of Public and General 
Employees, Canada 
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Club Volksmarche La Foulée, Québec Nature Québec, Canada 
Coalition des citoyens de Mékinac, Trois-
Rives, Québec 
New Westminster Environmental Partners, 
B.C., Canada 
Comité d'environnement Univert du Cégep de 
Lévis-Lauzon, Québec 
OJM (Organisme Jeunéthiquement 
Modifié), Canada 
Coopérative de solidartité d'alimentation saine 
La Manne, Victoriaville, Québec 
One Straw Society, Canada, 
www.onestraw.ca 
Eco-Cell at St. John's, Canada Ordre canadien des praticiens de 
naturopathie et des naturothérapies, Canada 
Énergie Citoyenne, Québec Parti vert du Québec, Canada 
Équiterre, Canada Regroupement des conseils régionaux de 
l'environnement du Québec, Canada 
FEASt (Food Education Action St. John's), 
NFLD, Canada 
Réseau Québécois contre les OGM, Canada 
Food Action Committe, Ecology Action 
Centre, Halifax 
Saskatchewan Network for Alternatives to 
Pesticides, Canada 
Furby Street Urban Farmers, Canada Saskatchewan Organic Directorate, Canada 
Greenpeace Canada St. John's United Church, Chesley, Ontario 
(GRAME) Groupe de recherche appliquée en 
macroécologie, Québec 
Syndicat Canadien des Télécommunications 
Transmarines 
Guiding Hands Recreation Society, B.C. Union Biologique Paysanne, Canada 
Hobrum Team West Coast, B.C. Union Paysanne, Canada 
L’ ACEF (Association Coopérative 
d'Économie Familiale) de Québec 
Vieux Palais de Justice de L'Assomption, 
Québec 
L’ avis bio / magazine Bio-bulle, Québec Wascana Federal Green Party Electoral 
District Association, Regina, SK, Canada 
L'Agora recherches et communications, 
Québec 
  
Source: (CBAN 2010) 
 
GM potato 
NatureMark, a subsidiary of Monsanto, first introduced GM potatoes to the US and 
Canadian market. The GM potato was “engineered to resist the Colorado beetle (Leptinotarsa 
decemlineata) and was made commercially available in 1995” (Mullins et al. 2006, 258). The GM 
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potatoes were “both insect resistant (by expressing Bacillus thuringiensis toxins) and viral 
resistant” (Phillips and Corkindale, 2002).  
 Phillips (2007), commenting on the regulatory process, observed that “GM potato 
necessitated Monsanto to undertake a three year regulatory review, beginning with confined field 
trials simultaneously in Canada and the US”. Further, Phillips (2007) noted that the approval 
process in Canada involved regulatory agencies, the CFIA and HC, while in the US, the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of 
Agriculture Animals and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) would be mandated to assess 
the trait for “human safety, safety as an animal feed and environmental impacts”. It is worth noting 
that the regulatory process, employed by the regulatory agencies of the US and Canada, are 
currently based on international conventions such as the Codex Alimentarius, the WTO Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement, 1994) and the 1997 
International Plant Protection Convention, all of which reject the precautionary principle. Instead 
they adopt a scientific framework of risk assessment. Doern and Prince (2012) observe that the EU 
approved GM potato for cultivation, a shift from its traditional posture, in spite of strong opposition 
from multiple domestic actors. 
 The evidence of these cases clearly suggests that the markets pathway, though a potentially 
powerful tool for moving relatively strong versions of the precautionary principle into domestic 
law and policy, is subject to a number of conditions for success. Most important, action along the 
markets pathway has to be supported by strong coalitions of domestic political actors, including 
producers, and this support has to persist over time in order to maintain the salience of the issue in 
the domestic political arena. Even here, as the EU decision on the GM potato illustrates, the support 
of a domestic political coalition can be thought of as a necessary but not sufficient condition. For 
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these reasons, the markets pathway is usually combined with the fourth pathway, direct 
intervention by international, transnational or foreign actors in the domestic politics of the target 
country. 
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Direct Access Pathway 
Introduction 
 Bernstein and Cashore (2012) suggest that the direct access pathway “captures those 
processes by which non-domestic financial resources, technical knowledge, expertise, training and 
learning can dramatically shape domestic politics” (p. 600). Success along this pathway is achieved 
when actors work at creating new coalitions or confront established ones, and “provid[e] resources 
for effective and enduring impacts on domestic governance and policy networks (p. 600). Skogstad 
(2000) confirms this assumption by suggesting that “Canadian case studies reveal evidence of a 
widening and deepening of policy networks as new non-state actors are drawn more fully into the 
policy process, often sharing power with state officials” (p. 819). Further, Skogstad (2000) 
suggests that as a result of following this pathway, “non-state actors may be able to forge coalitions 
that enable them to exercise influence commensurate with that of state officials and well-
entrenched economic interests” (p. 820). While Skogstad (2000) notes that actors, representing 
non-economic interests, are able to penetrate established networks and alter domestic policies 
discourse and outcomes, Bernstein and Cashore (2000) caution that actors can be successful at 
using this pathway, but only if their efforts to penetrate established networks “[do] not directly 
raise domestic concerns over violations of popular sovereignty” (p. 83) 
Evolution of the Canadian Biotechnology Strategy  
Doern and Prince (2012) suggest that biotechnology policy emerged in the 1980s as a result 
of its “explicit recognition as an important field and industry by the Ministry of State for Science 
and Technology (1980)” and then in response to international advancements, particularly in the 
US and to the “development of bio-food products” (p. 58).  
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Additionally, some aspects of the biotechnology policy were shaped by the creation of the 
1989 Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies and further by the 1983 Trudeau era 
National Biotechnology Strategy. The rationale for this strategy was the “support and promotion 
of R&D, investments, and private market acceptance of this new technology, accompanied by the 
establishment of any National Agricultural Biotechnology Council (NABC), whose earlier work 
helped pave the way for latter work of the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee (CBAC)” 
(Doern & Prince 2012, pg. 58). It is observed that although the NBAC initially adopted a strong 
pro-biotech policy position, its publications on the work included criticisms regarding citizens 
consultation, health, and structured values in an attempt to create a more balanced approach to 
biotechnology (Doern and Sheehy 1999). 
The groundwork established in the 1980s biotechnology policies was restructured by the 
1993 Federal Regulatory Framework for Biotechnology. The development of this framework 
based on consultations with various stakeholders of diverse interests and inter-departmental federal 
agencies. It provided the guiding principles for functioning of the federal biotechnology regulatory 
regime (Doern and Sheehy 1999; Industry Canada 1998) 
The 1993 Federal Regulatory Framework for Biotechnology was replaced by the 1998 
Canadian Biotechnology Strategy (CBS), which was tasked with the responsibility to create 
support for responsible development, application, and export of biotechnology products and 
services balanced within the context of ‘social and ethical considerations’ (Doern & Prince, 2012; 
Industry Canada 1998, pg. 1). In 1999 CBS was modified. The amendments incorporated into its 
strategy three strategic policy directions: stewardship, benefits/innovation and citizen engagement; 
the strategies were referred to as pillars. The pillar: stewardship was a reflection of the 
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government's efforts to include concepts such as safety, health and the environment (Canadian 
Biotechnology Secretariat 2002) 
The Canadian government implemented a 2003-2004 internal discussion with an emphasis 
on situating Canada as a leader in biotechnology and its application. The blueprint, as envisioned 
the government, detailed a framework, whit a mandate to “accelerate the commercialization of 
Canadian biotechnology research for the social, environmental, and economic benefit of 
Canadians” (Doern & Prince 2012, pg. 71). By 2005, the discourse surrounding biotechnology had 
evolved to include a broader understanding of ‘stewardship’, “anchoring it to a life-cycle approach, 
beginning with research and development and leading through distribution, processing, 
manufacturing sale and use, and to its eventual disposal or recycling back into further research” 
(Doern & Prince 2012, pg. 72; Industry Canada, 2005). 
 Consequently, this thesis examines the work of the CBAC, as it represents the clearest 
indication by the federal government to “provide comprehensive, independent expert advice on 
policy issues related to the ethical, social, regulatory, economic, scientific, environmental and 
health aspects of biotechnology” (Ag-West Biotech Inc. 2000) and promoted awareness by 
involving the Canadian public through public consultations. 
Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee (CBAC) 
As previously discussed, CBAC, an arm's length advisory body was formed in 1999 based 
on the advices of the Canadian Biotechnology Strategy. CBAC was charged with the mandate of 
raising awareness and engaging the Canadian public in a discourse on biotechnology and related 
issues. CBAC was also responsible for providing expert and independent advice “on the broad 
policy issues associated with the ethical, social, regulatory, economic, scientific, environmental 
and health aspects of biotechnology” (Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee 2000, 9). 
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Specifically, CBAC was responsible for advising the federal government on ways to: “(a) optimize 
the economic, health, safety and environmental benefits of biotechnology in a sustainable way in 
Canada through the CBS, (b) ensure that the science base that supports the government’s 
regulatory role is maintained and is internationally competitive (c)  incorporate social and ethical 
considerations into policy making, and (d) enhance public awareness and facilitate an open, 
transparent national conversation on key issues concerning the development and application of 
biotechnology in Canada” (Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee 2000, 9). CBAC 
organized itself into three standing committees to consider the three main themes of the CBS. 
These consisted of the Stewardship Committee, Economic and Social Development Committee 
and the Citizen Engagement Committee (Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee 2000). 
 
Direct Access and the CBAC Consultations 
 One of the tasks undertaken by CBAC One of the task undertaken by CBAC was the 
Canadian wide dialogue regarding biotechnology. This thesis is particularly interested in the five 
multi-stakeholder workshops held in Vancouver, Saskatoon, Toronto, Montreal and Halifax – 
April 2nd – 10th, 2001. This interest is premised on the assumption that the dialogue was a clear 
indication by the Canadian government that they were interested in ‘opening the direct access 
pathway’ in order to gain support and insight for the biotechnology industry in Canada and 
establish legitimacy to the regulatory framework.  
However, NGOs decided to boycott the public consultation process, citing that the work of 
the discussions were not democratic, inputs from NGOs were largely ignored and that the 
consultations were designed to supplant, possibly even replace much needed debate in the House 
of Commons on issues of Biotechnology (MacRae and Abergel 2012). This is not to say that the 
NGO community was unhappy with the mandate of CBAC or what it was attempting to achieve.  
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The dissatisfaction by the NGO community primarily rested on the fact that did not want 
CBAC being the instrument through which the discourse and particularly their views on 
biotechnology were filtered to government.  They wanted to be able to talk to parliament, primarily 
because they thought parliament was where the debate should be held and they were unwilling to 
provide a sense of legitimacy to process, and in so doing, jeopardize any future opportunity for 
meaningful dialogue. Additionally, some authors criticized the visible influence of Industry 
Canada on the consultation process, also contending that participants representing Industry 
outnumbered those of NGOs and civil society as a whole, even contending that this was a 
deliberate plan to alter the nature of the discourse (Hartley and Skogstad 2005; MacRae and 
Abergel 2012; Abergel and Barrett 2002). 
In addition to the activities carried out by CBAC, the Royal Society of Canada (RSC) was 
tasked with the responsibility to provide expert advice on the Canadian regulatory system and the 
scientific capacity the federal government to ensure food safety as it relates to innovative 
technologies such as biotechnology. The RSC is discussed here because, in part, it focused on the 
precautionary principle and its place in the Canadian regulatory structure. The RSC considered the 
principle to have “both scientific and regulatory validity” (The Royal Society of Canada 2001, 14). 
The RSC rejected the use of substantial equivalence “as a decision threshold to exempt new GM 
products from rigorous safety assessments on the basis of superficial similarities” (The Royal 
Society of Canada 2001, 226). Instead, it proposed that fundamental tenets of the “Precautionary 
Principle should be respected in the management of the risks associated with food biotechnology” 
(225).  
As it relates to this thesis, while the RSC did not address a particular formulation, it is a 
reasoned conclusion that the RSC preferred the implementation of a strong formulation of the 
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principle. The RSC suggested that the burden of proof be primarily shifted to the proponents and 
developers of food biotechnology, a key indication of a strong formulation. In addition to a 
suggestion that the burden of proof be shifted, the RSC also argued that the potential trigger for 
the application of the principle be “serious risk” (226) as opposed to the phrase ‘serious or 
irreversible damage’, which is contained in several key Canadian environmental legislations (See 
Chapter 5). 
The activities of CBAC and the fact that the Government of Canada has failed to implement 
the recommendation of the RSC on the issue of the precautionary principle is a reflection that the 
Government of Canada acts within the role of a gatekeeper. The term gatekeeper is used to describe 
the ability of the state to control the agenda of the state and decide which actors are allowed to 
partake in the policy process. It also points to the notion that the government is the chief policy 
maker and is solely responsible for the economic development of the state. The gate keeper 
function also the governments to pursue a particular policy direction so as to ensure a particular 
state interest or ensure the interest of a particular group, since they also control the level of 
influence each actor can assert on the process.  
 
Bill C-474  
An example of an attempt to use the direct access pathway to incite policy change is found 
in efforts to legislate Bill C-474. This private member bill, introduced by Alex Atamanenko, New 
Democratic Party (NDP) Agriculture Critic and Member of Parliament (MP) for British Colombia 
(B.C.) Southern Interior would necessitate “an analysis of potential harm to export markets be 
conducted before the sale of any new genetically engineered seed is permitted” (Parliament of 
Canada 2010)  While this initiative may seem like a purely domestic matter, it will be demonstrated 
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below that non-domestic interests were involved in funding interventions in support of C-474. 
Further, in a classic case of combining the market and direct access pathways, the framing of Bill 
C-474 highlights the attempt to use the threat of market access and restriction as a reason for 
changing the governance framework of biotechnology in Canada.  
The market pathways framing is found in the testimony of Lucy Sharrat, coordinator of the 
Canadian Biotechnology Action Network (CBAN), a former employee of the Sierra Club Canada, 
and a vocal supporter of Bill C-474. Lucy Sharrat states that “that there are fundamental problems 
with genetic engineering and fundamental problems with the Canadian government's approach to 
this technology, including our regulation” (Reschke, 2001). Additionally, Sharrat suggests that 
failure to change the existing regime can result in “cause chaos in the domestic and international 
market” (Reschke, 2001). 
Another critical observation is that on the surface, it appears that Bill C-474 was being 
championed by the NDP MP, Alex Atamanenko, garnering support from the Bloc Quebecois, in 
addition to several domestic actors [including some with global connections], Manitoba Forage 
Seed Association, the National Farmers Union, Inter Pares and USC Canada and Greenpeace 
Canada. The interests of organic producers and farmers were represented by the “Saskatchewan 
Organic Directorate, the Ecological Farmers' Association of Ontario, and Union Paysanne. It also 
includes coalitions of grassroots groups like the Society for a G.E. Free B.C., and the Prince 
Edward Island Coalition for a GMO-Free Province” (Reschke, 2001).  
 On the question of non-domestic funding, Bernstein and Cashore (2012) warn that “any 
attempts at influence along this pathway must navigate concerns about sovereignty and the risk of 
being viewed as foreign or international intrusion” (p. 593). Lucy Sharrat’s organization,  CBAN, 
is a project of Tides Canada Initiatives, one of the organizations considered by the government as 
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receiving foreign funding, working to undermine Canadian interests and a candidate to lose its 
charitable tax status.  
This is evidenced in the exchange between Mr. Blake Richards, Conservative member from 
Wild Rose, Alberta and Ms. Lucy Sharratt during meeting number 71 of the Standing Committee 
on Agriculture and Agri-Food. The committee, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), was engaged 
in discussing the agricultural and agri-food products supply chain in regards to grains and oilseeds 
(Parliament of Canada 2013) 
Richards contended that CBAN, along with the National Farmers Union and the Council 
of Canadians, had campaigned against free trade talks between Canada and Europe. In addition to 
questioning the motives of anti-GM groups such as CBAN, the National Farmers Union and the 
Council of Canadians, Richards questions “whether that's a proper use of charitable donations” 
(Parliament of Canada 2013)., stating that “[he’s] sure that most people are quite aware of Tides 
Canada and their history, but think[s] it's important to point out that according to media reports 
out there, Tides Canada has taken about $62 million from U.S. sources over the last decade” 
(Parliament of Canada 2013). 
Nonetheless, the failure of the attempt to legislate Bill C-474 and CBANs activities must 
be seem in the broader context of the evolution of the Canadian Biotechnology Strategy. Set in 
this context, the outcomes confirms the notion that economic, social, and political pressures 
constrain the decision making process of governments, and that changes in domestic policy cannot 
only be explained by international rules and globalization. It also supports the contention that 
international institutions, transnational actors, international norms, and market forces all 
combined, oftentimes with the assistance of domestic actors, shape and constrain domestic policy 
and decision makers.  
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CHAPTER 6. ANALYTICAL DISCUSSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, CONCLUSION 
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 In this chapter, I present an analytical discussion of activities occurring along the four 
distinct pathways of international and domestic influence on public policy: international norms 
and discourse, international rules, markets and direct access. These activities and the paths used 
by State and non-State actors help to shape the formulation of the precautionary principle adopted. 
The chapter also includes a discussion on recommendations as to how the precautionary principle 
can be better utilized by the government of Canada as an environmental norm. A conclusion 
summarizes the key findings, which is followed by a discussion of the policy implications. 
 
Analytical Discussion 
This research suggests that there are a number of actors, institutions and economic forces, 
operating both within and without the State. Further, these forces are able to constrain the ability 
of governments to make independent policy decisions. The pathways framework presents an 
alternative way of examining policy outcomes, by distinguishing the causal pathways though 
which domestic policy can be impacted and changed. This section of the research expands on the 
key findings observed and offers an analysis of these findings.  
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1. Once a pathway is activated, the power dynamics dictate which actors are allowed 
to traverse it in either direction    
 In theory, activities along a pathway are not restricted to one type of actor, for once a 
pathway is activated; multiple actors attempt to influence the outcome. This is however not true of 
the international norms and discourse pathway and the international rules pathway, since the 
international architecture only recognizes the state as the legitimate representative of its 
population. Different pathways and combinations of pathways create advantages and 
disadvantages for state and non-state actors. In the case of the precautionary principle and Canada, 
the Government of Canada accessed the international norms pathway during the negotiation stages 
of the Rio Declaration, the CBD, and the Cartagena protocol. This access has allowed non-State 
actors to lobby governments and promote competing ideas, indirectly challenging the role of the 
State as the only legitimate actor in the international sphere. The activities of non-state actors lose 
their effectiveness as they are not seen as equal with states or as representatives of the state.  
 Further, these activities transpire outside of the formal legal process and take the form of 
protests at the locations where treaties and international agreements are being discussed and 
formulated.  
 The major difference between State and non-State actors is that while non-State actors are 
able to promote a particular norm in the international arena and they are capable of conveying the 
norm from the international to the domestic arena in the form of discourse, they cannot ensure that 
the norm will be embodied in domestic law and policy. This inability to make the norm effective 
in domestic policy is because non-State actors are not only significantly disadvantaged along the 
international rules pathway, but also lack the institutional framework necessary to convey a norm 
from the international sphere to the domestic sphere.  
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 On the other hand, states possess a privileged status, which enables them to promote a 
particular discourse at the international level and return to the domestic sphere with a formulation 
of the norm that is consistent with their national interests, as in the case of the precautionary 
principle adopted by Canada. This is so because the international governance architecture allows 
States to have privileged access, while relegating non-State actors to observer status, giving them 
access, but making their efforts ineffective (as reflected in Table 7).  
Table 7 – Power dynamics operating along the pathways 
 
 International 
Rules 
International 
Norms & 
Discourse 
Markets Direct Access 
State Actors Privileged 
Access 
Privileged 
Access  
Gatekeepers, but 
vulnerable  
Gatekeepers 
Non-State 
Actors 
Access, but 
ineffective, 
because one-
directional from 
national to 
international 
level 
Access, but 
ineffective, 
because no 
guarantee that 
the norm will 
become law 
Access, effective 
if able to achieve 
consumer buy in 
and in 
combination 
with direct 
access 
Access, effective 
if domestic 
concerns over 
sovereignty is 
dispelled 
 
 During the negotiations of the Cartagena protocol, Canada aligned itself with other major 
GM exporting countries. In this way, Canada promoted a particular formulation of the principle in 
order to guarantee and maintain its competitive advantage as a major exporter of GM products, 
arguing that an adoption of the precautionary principle, instead of a scientific approach, would 
jeopardize its biotech industry and negatively affect its export potential. Not surprisingly, the 
discourse and the manner in which the Government conceived the precautionary principle is now 
reflected in several key domestic legislations (as discussed in Chapter 5) and is also reflected in 
the Government of Canada Discussion Document on the Precautionary Approach/Principle.  
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 With the international rules pathway now activated by the state through participation and 
signature of the Rio Declaration, the CBD, and the Cartagena protocol (though not ratified), Non-
State actors are now capable of leveraging this fact in an attempt to influence policy, but are unable 
to convey norms along the pathway. Instead, this thesis found that attempts at challenging or 
influencing policy outcomes are channeled through the judicial system. This was observed by the 
numerous instances within Canada’s domestic courts where actors desirous of the adoption of a 
strong formulation of the principle and those seeking to give it the status of customary international 
law, repeatedly referenced Canadian international obligations, oftentimes targeting the 
international reputation of Canada. This was particularly evident in the Spraytech case, the Sage 
Grouse case and the EC Hormones case. However, there is no evidence to suggest that this strategy 
is able to bring about the adoption of a strong formulation of the principle. Essentially, the 
international rules and the international norms and discourse pathways deny access to non-state 
actors.  
 The evidence of multiple activities by various actors along the various pathways is 
significant but what is more important is the fact that activity along a pathway can occur in a multi-
directional manner, as in the case of the state and the international rules and the international norms 
and discourse pathways. The state is able to promote a particular norm at the international level 
and subsequently convey the formulation of that norm to domestic policies and law. This is an 
especially significant finding when we consider that Bernstein and Cashore (2012), Gomar, 
Stringer, and Paavola (2013), Hudson (2012) and Kasa (2013), all referencing the pathways 
framework, conceived that each individual pathway would allow for influence traveling in a 
unidirectional manner only.  Gomar, Stringer, and Paavola (2013) posited that the pathways 
amount to a top-down approach, while  Hudson (2012) and Kasa (2013) implicitly support this 
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argument. Thus, this thesis advances the notion that State-actors are able to traverse the 
International pathways in a multi-directional manner, while non-State actors are only able to 
promote ideas at the international sphere, but are unable to transmit that norm to the domestic 
level.  
 
2. The International Rules and the international norms and discourse pathway do not 
guarantee the adoption of a strong formulation of the precautionary principle in 
domestic law  
The international norms and discourse pathways represent the first logical step that 
international and domestic actors take in order to bring international norms into the domestic 
political arena. The findings of this thesis reveal that actors use discourse, especially during the 
deliberations and negotiation stages of international agreements, with the expressed intent of 
promoting and advancing a particular norm. Specifically, it is observed that the international rules 
and international norms and discourse pathways privilege state actors and restrict access to non-
State actors, and in instances where access is granted, their access is ineffective. 
Non-state actors are not allowed to negotiate international agreements; this privilege is only 
given to state actors who legitimately represent their citizens. The issue of sovereignty is critical 
here, as non-state actors cannot be seen as attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of a state. 
As such, the rules of international institutions, such as the WTO and the UN, privilege state actors, 
and relegate non-state actors to the status of observer. Therefore, once the precautionary principle 
is articulated and internationally established, the ability of non-state actors to influence the 
principle becomes less effective. Consequently, this leaves those desirous of policy change with 
 96 
 
no other alternative but to adopt additional pathways of influence, particularly at the domestic 
level. 
As noted earlier, non-State actors are disadvantaged along this pathway, which means that 
States have unrestricted access, and more specifically, it States possess the status of privileged 
actors. This privileged status allows the State to promote a unique formulation of a norm in the 
international arena, subsequently returning to the domestic sphere with a formulation that is 
aligned with the economic and national interests of the State.  
In the case of Canada, in instances where an international agreement contains a strong 
formulation of the precautionary principle, the guiding instrument governing treaty law, the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, ensures that States cannot be constrained to abide by 
the provisions of a treaty or agreement if they have not signed and ratified said agreement. 
Bernstein & Cashore (2012) supports this analysis and suggesting that indeed “international 
agreements influence domestic policy to the extent that they create binding obligations on states 
through international law” (p. 589). This means that non-state actors are disadvantaged along this 
pathway since they cannot pressure governments to comply with certain international agreements, 
which the state in question has not signed or ratified, since non-state are unable to utilize what 
Franck (1990) refers to as a ‘pull towards compliance’. 
Further, in cases where disputes were initiated at the international level, such as the ICJ 
and the WTO, in order to ensure compliance, this pathway has proven to be unhelpful to 
proponents of the precautionary principle. This conclusion is confirmed in the cases before the 
ICJ, WTO and national courts, and can be based on the following rationales. Firstly, the vexing 
conceptual uncertainties, and the fact that there no generally accepted definition of the 
precautionary principle, has relegated the principle to a norm, but not a norm amounting to 
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customary international law. This, then, has allowed States to promote and subsequently adopt 
varying formulations of the principle within domestic legislation, without fear of legal sanction. 
Secondly, international and domestic tribunals have been reluctant to give effect to the 
precautionary principle because of two legal maxims: res judicata and onus probandi incumbit 
actori.  
The principle of res judicata is the legal principle which states that a case may not, 
generally, be re-litigated once it has been adjudicated on the merits  (Hans 1962; Shell 
1987).Consequently, both international and domestic judges have been reluctant to provide a 
broader scope for the precautionary principle outside of what is entailed in the Nuclear Tests Case.  
Under the well-established principle of onus probandi incumbit actori, “it is for the 
claimant to prove his claim” (Amerasinghe 2004, 281). Evidence of this principle is demonstrated 
in the consistent rulings of the WTO, where disputes are based on the need to demonstrate where 
the burden of proof rests. The decision of the WTO Appellate Body in United States - Measure 
Affecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India19 stated that:  
“we find it difficult, indeed, to see how any system of judicial settlement could work if it 
incorporated the proposition that the mere assertion of a claim might amount to proof. It 
is, thus, hardly surprising that various international tribunals, including the International 
Court of Justice, have generally and consistently accepted and applied the rule that the 
party who asserts a fact, whether the claimant or the respondent, is responsible for 
providing proof thereof. Also, it is a generally accepted canon of evidence in civil law, 
common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the burden of proof rests upon the party, 
whether complaining or defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or 
                                                 
 
19 B.3.1.1 US — Wool Shirts and Blouses, p. 14, DSR 1997:I, p. 323 at 335 
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defense. If that party adduces evidence sufficient to raise a presumption that what is 
claimed is true, the burden then shifts to the other party, who will fail unless it adduces 
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption” 
Further, in the EC Hormones case, para 98, the WTO ruled that: 
“The initial burden lies on the complaining party, which must establish a prima facie case 
of inconsistency with a particular provision of the SPS Agreement on the part of the 
defending party, or more precisely, of its SPS measure or measures complained about. 
When that prima facie case is made, the burden of proof moves to the defending party, 
which must in turn counter or refute the claimed inconsistency”  
 
These rulings have significant implications for the precautionary principle, and have 
severely hindered the promotion of a strong formulation of the principle along the international 
rules pathway. The strong formulation gains its status and significance based on the reversal of the 
burden of proof. Therefore, both weak and moderately weak formulations of the principle can be 
easily promoted along this pathway, since they do not require a shifting of the burden of proof, 
essentially impeding proponents of the strong formulation.   
 Finally, decisions made by the world’s influential and authoritative international judicial 
bodies do much to shed light on the barriers facing actors desirous of promoting a strong 
formulation of the precautionary principle. They also account for why the international rules 
pathway can only produce a weak or moderately weak formulation of the precautionary principle. 
It clarifies the nature of the relationship between international and domestic courts, specifically 
accounting for why international and domestic have been reluctant to provide the precautionary 
principle with a more significant role in environmental regulations. Within the context of this 
 99 
 
thesis, it is now clear that the very makeup of the international rules pathway and the international 
norms and discourse pathway significantly disadvantage non-state actors and does not guarantee 
a strong formulation of the precautionary principle in domestic policy, while concurrently allowing 
the privileged access of State actors.  
3. Actors reinforce their positions by traversing multiple pathways  
Another significant observation posited by this thesis is that actors can concurrently access 
multiple pathways, attempting to influence a particular outcome. In the case of the Cartagena 
protocol and the EC - Beef Growth Hormones Case, the government of Canada was able to 
promote a particular discourse along the international norms and discourse pathway, while 
concurrently accessing the international rules pathway. As such, the government of Canada 
effectively guaranteed the adoption of a weak formulation of the precautionary principle by 
refusing to include the words “precautionary principle” in key international instruments such as 
the Cartagena Protocol and the Codex agreement.  
On the part of non-state actors, evidence of the use of multiple pathways is also observed 
during the GM wheat debate. Coalition actors were able to rally the support of likeminded groups 
by working along the direct access pathway in order to change policy, or in this case, negatively 
affect GM producers. They were also able to garner public support for their cause, giving them a 
greater degree of influence than they would normally enjoy. They also argued that the 
commercialization would negatively affect exports, pressuring the Canadian government, GM 
producers, GM companies and importing States. This evidence suggests that while the State acts 
as the gatekeeper for the markets pathway, states remain vulnerable,. This vulnerability is evident 
when the economic interest of organized local actors and the State is threatened and when there is 
widespread local support by consumers for policy change. As discussed in Chapter 5, the 
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gatekeeper function allows the government to decide what is best for the state and to act in a 
manner that ensures its survival. Further, as also previously noted in Chapter 5, the gatekeeper 
determines which actors are allowed into the policy process.  
Also, as observed along the international norms and discourse pathway, actors such as 
ENGOs, anti-GM activists, and biotechnology corporations can concurrently promote various 
framings of a discourse, in-order to shift public perceptions and ultimately public policy. In the 
case of Council for Biotechnology Information and BIOTECanada, proponents of biotechnology, 
along the international norms and discourse, deliberately attempted to buttress their interests and 
diminish the influence of rival actors traversing this pathway.  
 
4. In the case of Canadian GM products, non-State actors have more success 
combining the Markets and the Direct Access pathways 
The findings of this thesis suggest that non-state actors have had the most success when 
the markets and direct access pathways are engaged simultaneously. Dissenting opinions, 
emerging from unsuccessful attempts to change and/or challenge the strong formulation along the 
international rules and international norms and discourse pathways, take on a legal after life and 
encourage the ‘losers’ to engage additional pathways.  
In the case of Canada’s, biotechnology, it is clear that the markets and direct access 
pathways have been vigorously traversed by anti-GM activists, and with varied levels of success. 
The combination of these pathways has forced several large firms to de-commercialize several 
GM crops and, destroy the technology, as in the case of CDC triffid. However, in instances where 
actors have tried to influence policy change along the direct access Pathway, without concurrently 
accessing the markets pathway, there are few successful cases. Both this example and the case of 
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the Government of Canada simultaneously using the international norms and discourse and the 
international rules pathways, suggest that there are interactions occurring between various 
pathways and a successful strategy will involve multiple pathways from the international to the 
domestic policy levels. 
A possible explanation of how these interaction influences work can be found in the failed 
attempt to legislate Bill C-474. Firstly, within the Canadian political system, opposition MPs and 
backbencher MPs exercise little influence, resulting in their inability to leverage the requisite 
power mechanisms to promote policy change. A further disadvantage, evident in this case, is the 
reality that the locus of power rests with the ruling party and the Cabinet, and in case of Bill C-
474, there was no support from the Conservative government. 
The findings along this pathway shed light on the importance of power dynamics at play 
within the Canadian political system. Specifically, it exposes a key variable that must be 
considered when analyzing policy outcomes: power. In the case of biotechnology and Canada, the 
interests of the biotech industry are supported by the government at relevant international forums, 
evidenced by the insistence of the Canadian government during the Cartagena protocol, Codex 
meetings, international, multi-lateral trade agreements, and during international disputes. At the 
domestic level, the Canadian government’s declaration, which identifies  biotechnology as a 
valued and strategically important industry (Doern and Prince 2012), suggests that any attempt to 
influence domestic policy outcomes by appealing to decisions and agreements at the international 
level will necessitate a multiple path approach.  
As such, non-State actors are unlikely to successfully influence policy change through 
conventional institutional channels, where their recommendations and presence goes unnoticed, 
rendering them incapable of challenging the status quo.  Regarding agricultural biotechnology and 
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Canada, it seems that policy changes have a higher probability of occurring when there are 
widespread threats of boycotts or information campaigns that are designed to sway public 
perceptions and pressure key international importers, such as the EU and Japan. These maneuvers 
seem to change the power dynamics, buttressing the notion that, in the Canadian context, success 
is better guaranteed when multiple pathways of influence are engaged, but in cases where there is 
a lack of support from the ‘power structures, success is largely symbolic.      
The markets pathway sees the state acting as a gatekeeper, which means that the state 
possesses the necessary institutional support to regulate and control access to decision making. 
The GM cases illustrate particularly clearly the synergies between the markets and direct access 
pathways. For the direct access pathway, the state remains a significant gatekeeper, as the recent 
actions of the Canadian Government to identify “foreign” environmental organizations working in 
Canada and its policy of revoking the charitable taxation status of NGOs it deems “primarily 
political” illustrate. As globalization strengthens international trading links, governments find 
themselves less able to act as gatekeepers along the markets pathway, for example by retaliating 
against trading partners whom they deem to be interpreting international norms or international 
law in ways that provide them with an unfair trading advantage.  Governments will attempt to 
make life increasingly difficult for campaigners in order to compensate for their diminished power 
along the markets pathway. 
5. The outcomes of the political conflict over the precautionary principle in Canada can 
be explained, in part, by the pathways used by the actors  
 As noted under the International Rules section of Chapter 5, various formulations of the 
precautionary principle can be found in several federal government policies. These include CEPA, 
SARA, CEAA, and the PCPA. Additional expressions of the precautionary principle can be found 
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in the federal government discussion document: A Canadian Perspective on the Precautionary 
Approach/Principle Proposed Guiding Principles and the Privy Council Office document “A 
Framework for the Application of Precaution in Science-based Decision Making about Risk,” 
Remarkably, neither of these documents endorse the precautionary principle as a rule of customary 
international law (Privy Council Office 2003). The government of Canada, through its laws and 
guiding documents, ensures that the application of precaution is undertaken within a science-based 
risk management approach. 
The language and policy approaches present in these documents are consistent with the 
government of Canada’s practice in the field of environmental protection, food safety, and 
standards and international tribunals such as the WTO settlement mechanism. Further, this 
language and policy approach is also reflected in Canadian environmental regulations such as 
CEPA, SARA, CEAA, and the PCPA. Thus, the practical conclusion is that the particular version 
of the precautionary principle that is adopted by Canada traveled through the international rules 
and the international norms and discourse pathways, as it is a reflection of Canadian’s position 
during the negotiations of the Cartagena Protocol and Canada’s position at the WTO.  
The nature of the international rules and the international norms and discourse pathways 
has shaped the formulation found in Canadian legislation. This is particularly true of the 
international norms pathway, since the pathway allows for the weakest form of the norm to be 
transmitted. Canada sought to promote and subsequently transmit a weak formulation of the 
principle because failing to do so would jeopardize its status as a GM exporting economy.   Further, 
the formulations found in various Canadian environmental regulations are a reflection of the fact 
that there are multiple formulations of the precautionary principle within the international sphere. 
These formulations range from weak to strong as shown in Table 2 (pg. 22).  
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Finally, the analysis of where the precautionary principle is located on the strong to weak 
spectrum has the potential to benefit actors desirous of seeing a stronger formulation of the 
principle implemented. It opens the door to actors desirous of seeing a stronger formulation by 
identifying the weakness of a proposed or existing formulation and in so doing, allows them to 
make appropriate suggestions, with the intent of moving the formulation into a stronger category.  
 
6. Within the Canadian context, the adoption of a weak formulation of the 
precautionary principle does not guarantee increased innovation and 
commercialization. 
A prominent criticism of the precautionary principle is that the adoption of a strong 
formulation acts as a barrier to innovation (Pittinger and Bishop 1999). As such, we could assume 
that the adoption of a weak or moderate formulation would act as a catalyst for innovation, 
providing firms with the ideal regulatory environment where innovation and commercialization of 
new technology would thrive. The Conference Board of Canada noted that Canada was the “first 
country to grow biotech crop, with full commercial products of canola, corn and soybeans” (p. 3). 
However,  despite having adopted a relatively weak formulation of the precautionary principle, 
Canada’s commercialization record has been poor when compared with the US and other OECD 
countries (Mitchell and Munn-Venn 2005). 
The combination of a weak version of the precautionary principle and a low level of 
commercialization in Canada can be explained in two ways: Firstly, the regulatory framework is 
not the only variable that accelerates or hinders innovation and commercialization. Rather, these 
variables can also include investor’s confidence, access to capital, and eternal market influence 
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Secondly, a strong formulation hinders innovation, but the formulation can act as a barrier without 
being present in the host country. In other words, when there is a lack of coherence regarding the 
formulation of the precautionary principle, which is adopted by other States, these agreements can 
directly affect the level of commercialization in other countries by creating uncertainty about 
access to export markets.  
 
Policy implications 
 Brooks (1989) defines public policy as “the broad framework of ideas and values within 
which decisions are taken and action, or inaction, is pursued by governments in relation to some 
issue or problem” (p. 16). This definition suggests that governments are tasked with the 
responsibility to engage in complex decision making, sometimes employing various methods of 
analysis in a way consistent with national or institutional interests. The case of decision making 
concerning environmental and food safety regulations are no different.  
 As such, an understanding of what causal pathways influence particular outcomes offers 
decision makers a potentially useful framework for modelling and simplifying complex 
governance arrangements, the framework also aids in identifying various influential actors, 
allowing decisions makers the option of either using mitigating strategies to curb their opponents’ 
efforts or seeking potential alliances based on shared interests. We should not exaggerate the policy 
relevance of pathways analysis. Reviewing the application of the pathways framework to the case 
of forest policy in Canada, Jeremy Wilson has argued that the framework lacks predictive capacity 
for two reasons, both of which are evident in the GM cases studies. First, each of the pathways 
enables a wide variety of different strategies and approaches. Second, “we can expect to find that 
as they design and adapt strategies, NGOs slide naturally from one pathway to the next” (2003, 
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21) in unpredictable ways. Nevertheless, Wilson argues that pathways framework does alert policy 
makers to the consequences of the internationalization of a policy issue, that the issue will be 
“significantly influenced by pressures and ideas originating from beyond Canadian borders” (22). 
This feature of the GM case explains how the Canadian government could win the battle to 
enshrine a weak version of the precautionary principle in domestic law and policy but lose the 
larger war to promote the idea of science-based risk assessment as the basis of science and 
innovation policy. Thus, understanding how best to invoke the pathways where state actors have 
an advantage can allow governments to manage the particular version of the principle that they 
eventually wish to adopt, and to see that version evolve into ‘hard rules’ of customary law in of 
biotechnology sector. However, the information gathered during this research suggests that a more 
realistic outlook for the principle is that there will continue to be varying formulations, and the 
status of the principle will remain unchanged but not unchallenged. As well, regulatory 
harmonization will remain an aspiration as a result of competing interests and ideas, with 
harmonization becoming increasingly difficult to achieve over time.  
The implications of disharmony will ultimately result in a disjointed effort to engage in 
meeting the demands of food security, with developing countries facing increased uncertainty and 
food shortages. Also, developing countries will remain reluctant to adopt the technology and/or 
receive food aid if the aid is comprised of genetically modified products or seed. This is because 
they fear losing market access to countries which are opposed to GM technology. The discourse 
at the international level suggests that the decision to adopt a strong formulation of the 
precautionary principle by national decision makers is premised on the notion of protectionist 
policies, with the intention of protecting domestic markets and industry, as is the case of importing 
countries such as the EU and Japan. On the other hand, countries that adopt a weak or moderate 
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formulation of the principle, do so with the intention of maintaining market access and ensuring 
the protection of a comparative advantage, as is the case in exporting countries such as the US and 
Canada.  
   
Postscript 
I have argued that the international rules pathway is not sufficient to explain the 
formulation of the precautionary principle adopted by Canada. The thesis suggests that there are 
additional pathways through which international norms are transmitted to the domestic realm. The 
findings of this research have implications for how we account for policy change, since it takes 
into account the role of non-state actors, institutions and interests.  
Specifically, the thesis also revealed that State actors possess privileged access along the 
international rules and the international norms and discourse pathways. This status occurs because 
of the structure of the global governance architecture, which positions the state as the legitimate 
representatives of a member country. Non-state actors have access along these paths, but they 
remain ineffective owing to their inability to stand as equals with State actors in the international 
arena. In the case of the international rules pathway, Non-state actors are able to exert pressure on 
governments in order to change domestic policies, but only if they are able to raise issues of non-
compliance by the state. Success can also be achieved based on the moral vulnerability of the state. 
Along the markets pathway, the state is seen as a gatekeeper. This means that the state is 
able to dictate which actors are given access but they remain vulnerable to consumer pressure, 
since the consumer is the actor who gives the state legitimacy. Similarly to the markets pathways, 
the state acts as a gatekeeper along the direct access pathway, but unlike the markets pathway, they 
are not vulnerable to non-state actors along this pathway. For non-state actors, success along this 
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pathway occurs when the State grants access, but access can be blocked if the state perceives a 
treat to its sovereignty. 
These findings are important, not only because the formulation of the precautionary 
principle adopted by a country can have implications for innovation and technology 
commercialization, but also because we are now better able to account for how a particular 
formulation is adopted.  
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